Italy Braces Itself For The Full Monti

The Italian government, Mario Monti informed the country’s parliament last Thursday, is now planning to concentrate its attentions on achieving economic growth. A timely decision this, since the statistics office announcement a day earlier that the country had once more fallen back  into recession, while not being a surprise nonetheless does constitute a cause for concern.

Not that Italy is any stranger to recession, since the country has now had five of them since entering Europe’s Monetary Union at the turn of the century. In fact the Italian economy has now contracted in eight of the last 15 quarters, and GDP is back in the good old days of 2003, stuck below the level it first attained in the first three months of 2004. And of course it is now going backwards in time again. Depending on the depth of the recession now being provoked it is touch-and-go whether the economy might not at some point even revisit levels last seen in the closing years of the 1990s. And remember, this is not deflation ridden Japan, this is real, not nominal GDP we are talking about here. So far Italy hasn’t been experiencing deflation, or at least not yet it hasn’t. Continue reading

Is Finland Really A Closet Member Of The Eurozone Periphery?

At a time when many eyes look hopefully towards the ECB for the kind of action which may prove to be the salvation of the much beleagured Eurozone other, more critical, ones are casting themselves back over the recent track record of the institution itself, and asking what, if any, responsibility the Frankfurt-based bankers have for having allowed Euro Area government finances to fall into the sorry state they are now in. Continue reading

Not Really Uniting, to Not Really Save the Euro…Not Really

The British newspapers are full of lines like “UK vetoes EU uniting to save euro” and worse. This illuminates a huge problem with the European Union.

The first problem is that this assumes that somebody’s going to save the euro. This is an error of the same form as the classic Yes, Minister joke:

We’ve got to do something. This is something. Therefore we’ve got to do it.

Given what I’ve already said about this, I’m very far from convinced that balanced-budget amendments will “save the euro”. Further, the UK isn’t opposed to the euro as a matter of policy and you have to be very, very Commission-minded to imagine that everyone outside is secretly either desperate to get in, or else desperately trying to keep the euro from sucking them in. Also, there’s nothing intrinsically good about “uniting around” a bad idea. Being united and wrong isn’t a good thing. As we used to say at school:

Why did you do it? Lee told me to do it. If Lee told you to do it, would you jump off a cliff?

But all this is a special case of a general problem. There is a dreadful poverty of discourse about the EU. Whatever happens gets discussed in terms of europhiles vs. eurosceptics, intergovernmental vs. supranational, nation A vs. nation B. In the UK’s national context, this meant that the prime minister could announce a veto on lower reserve capital requirements for banks and be accused of selling out to the City. I mean, it’s weird enough in itself, but it doesn’t make sense to claim that he’s selling out to the banks in doing something that directly, mathematically costs them money.

It is rare that any policy proposal regarding the EU gets discussed seriously on its content, rather than as part of a specialised form of horse-race journalism. Is one nation or institution getting an edge in the game of diplomacy? Last week’s summit cut across all the standard EU dichotomies. A Tory veto on lower reserve requirements? French and German backing for a purely intergovernmental arrangement? Core European demands for aggressively procyclical economics? If you were working on any of the usual rules, you’d be completely disoriented, and it’s painfully obvious that so many people are.

So let’s discuss the merits. The headline proposal is to make everyone have a balanced-budget amendment in their national constitution. (They weren’t exactly holding back!) This sets a limit of 0.5% of GDP for the cyclically-adjusted structural budget deficit, and requires a 1/60th reduction every year in the public debt over and above 60% of GDP. This sounds pretty Hooverite, but it’s worth noting that it’s also full of language that leaves lots of room for interpretation. “Cyclically adjusted” means that there could be leeway for a stimulus, and a “structural” budget deficit is precisely whatever the person who defines “structural” wants it to be.

Further, it mentions leveraging the EFSF and states that the EFSF and ESM will operate with the European Central Bank as their agent. This sounds like something worth having, and the ECB’s announcements on Friday do suggest that there might be quite a bit more central bank liquidity coming.

It also takes note of the trade problem – at last. This is important. There is language in there that accepts that the intra-eurozone trade imbalances are a problem and that it’s not enough to flog the deficit states. However, if the budgetary outs were vague, this is far vaguer.

And finally, there were a gaggle of added extras like wanting to have all transactions in euros cleared via the ECB and maybe moving the European Banking Authority to Paris, which seems to have freaked out David Cameron something good and proper. I can’t see why this stuff should have been on a serious agenda – it’s more Silvio Berlusconi’s style – but perhaps the temptation was unavoidable, and I may come back to this in a post on the diplomatic side of the story.

In conclusion, whether this “fiscal compact” is going to be Euro-Hooverism or “hard Keynesianism” seems to depend mostly on political will and interpretation, the first being the father of the second. A reading that emphasises the hard numbers and takes an ungenerous definition of “cyclical” and “structural”, that considers the ECB’s role as “agent” to mean just acting as a broker, and that considers the clause on trade imbalances to be hot air, will give us the first.

However, a reading that takes a sceptical view of the reality of “structural”, that thinks the pits of a depression are the place to exploit a cyclical adjustment if there ever was one, and that insists on pushing the imbalances clause, would get us somewhere else entirely, especially if it also suggests that the “agent” might have more “agency” than just processing transactions.

Sympathy for the devil. Well, at least he’s not Berlusconi

Well, what a week that was. 7% was the new 6%, the cows broke through the ECB’s electric fence, the Greeks took a week to decide who ought to be prime minister after, to be honest, the G20 decided George Papandreou shouldn’t be, and Silvio Berlusconi went the same way.

It’s hard to feel much for bunga boy, but this post from James Hamilton at Econbrowser explains why I feel some sympathy for the old devil. Basically, as everyone sort of knows, the long term constraint on a government budget is that nominal GDP growth is ahead of the nominal interest rate on the debt it needs to raise (or roll-over) every year. As Italy is close to primary-balance, the roll-overs are the interesting bit.

How you think about this is important – quite a few people are arguing over whether Italy is “illiquid or insolvent”. But this is a distinction without a difference, as it’s quite possible to get from solvency to insolvency (or the other way around) just through changes in the nominal interest rate. The rate is both cause and effect at once. On the other hand, you could say the same about GDP and indeed Hamilton and our own Ed Hugh do.

But once you accept this, there are some important policy implications. For a start, it creates the possibility of self-defeating austerity.

If you decide to increase taxes and/or reduce government spending in order to increase the primary surplus and pay down the debt faster, you are basically going to reduce nominal GDP. Public-sector saving is a withdrawal from national income. You may argue that this represents supply-side reform that will have good consequences down the line, but does anyone imagine that the long run was uppermost in anyone’s mind last week? And if it was, how come Italy can sell one-year treasury bills at better rates than it can 10-year bonds? Clearly, the markets actually expect that the worst is still to come.

Similarly, you might argue that it is internal devaluation, but then, the constraint is nominal GDP growth higher than nominal interest rates. And you’d have to make some brave assumptions about the price-elasticity of your exports, the percentage of their price accounted for by labour, and the impact on the consumer sector of the internal devaluation. The condition of non-exploding debts says nothing about whether growth is internal or export-led.

Another problem is that the market can stay irrational longer than you can stay president. Imagine a scenario in which there really is some package of reforms that need a dramatic cuts plan right now, but certainly will pay off in higher GDP growth in the future. I mean, I can’t, but perhaps others can, as so many politicians seem to manage it. Does anyone doubt that, if it depressed GDP in the first year enough to get significantly under the constraint, that the interest rate wouldn’t spike high enough to bring about a massive budget crisis in short order?

So yes, Berlusconi was dancing around the very real possibility of a completely pointless and indeed self-defeating purgebinge. Wouldn’t you?

There is a wider point here. Kantoos is very keen on the point that Italy lost a sizable margin of competitiveness during the 2000s. (And who’s responsible for that? we all cry – would it be the dynamic businessman from Milan with the permanently refilled Viagra prescription by any chance?) But this Street Light post makes an excellent point. Southern Europeans put in more hours per worker, and in some countries more of them work, than Germans. The fact that all this effort is going to waste should embarrass everybody, and especially Silvio Berlusconi. But it is more embarrassing that the proposed solution is to put a lot of them out of work!

That reminded me of this post of Peter Dorman’s at Econospeak on another frequent AFOE concern, demography. He makes the excellent point that it is a problem in so far as productivity growth per worker doesn’t keep up with the dependency ratio, and only in so far as it doesn’t. If you want me to take you seriously about why Italian or Greek wages should fall, kindly set out your proposals for what Italian and Greek management can do to close the productivity gap.

There’s an argument that the best thing managers could do would be to resign and leave the workers to self-manage, but it’s somehow unlikely that this will be on offer. It’s true, however, that getting rid of employment protections has no measurable benefit in terms of GDP growth.

All that said, Dani Rodrik has a fascinating paper out on manufacturing and productivity. Specifically, it’s the only sector that shows a clear global trend in which less productive economies catch up with the best in class. Worryingly, this is most pronounced in exactly the subsectors that the German economy is strongest in. That certainly puts this Blodget Insider post in an interesting light. On the other hand, even in China, we’re seeing the end of cheap labour.

mining in North Manchester

Alex’s post on the sub-prime/ legal loansharking industry’s rental of the Conservative Party reminds me again of the odd cluster of payday loan cum pawnbroking storefronts in our local high street; four on a hundred yard frontage.

Now the thing is that Crumpsall ward has low numbers of absolutely workless households, but the highest number in Manchester of households earning below 60% of median income, the official poverty metric. Still, they have stuff in their houses, stuff that can be pawned, until it runs out. And they have an income: a low income, but one bad month for them allows you to crack into it and extract yourself a little value. And once you’ve extracted that value, you’ve created the need which enables you to crack into it again next month and the month after that. Some of this, of course, can be kicked upstairs for legislative protection. And so here is our growth sector with its own emerging lobby. Not Osborne’s magic export pixies but the working poor considered as an extractive industry.

Eastern European Growth – Coming Rapidly Off The Boil?

The latest round of EU GDP data, brought to light a reality which many who have been closely following the economies of Eastern Europe already suspected: that the heavily export dependent economies in the region would almost inevitably be dragged down by the rapid slowdown in Europe’s principal economic motor, the German economy (see this post for background). Continue reading

This economic government is neither economic nor government

I don’t know why the FT Brussels blog thinks it’s surprising that the Portuguese economy is showing signs of life, or at least non-catastrophe, while the “German growth engine” is slowing down. This shouldn’t be complicated – a current account surplus increases GDP, a deficit reduces it, and globally, current accounts must sum to zero. If the Portuguese – or southern Europe in general – reduce their trade deficit, as the large majority of their trade is within the Eurozone, Germany has to reduce its surplus or else redirect it to extra-European trade. Because the EU is the wealthiest trading bloc on earth, such redirection implies that Euro-exporters need to cut prices. Whether they lose some aggregate demand by cutting volume or by cutting prices is a secondary question.

What is true, however, is that if the trade-deficit states in the Eurozone try to solve their problems by reducing their current accounts, their living standards will fall and so will the trade-surplus states’ GDP. This appears to be precisely what is happening.

So what about that “economic government”, eh? Even the title doesn’t fill me with confidence. It amounts to a cliché of European politics, an old tune favoured by the French foreign ministry (because it rivals the Bretton Woods institutions) and the EU Commission’s ECFIN and internal market directorates (because it offers them more power). This is, at least, the first time I’ve seen any detail about what it is and what it’s meant to do. And all it seems to have to offer is yet more deflation.

Let’s go through this one. The original Stability Pact demanded restrictions on government budgets. The Eurozone states did try hard to implement this and therefore got less of the late 90s boom than other countries did. In the early 2000s recession, France and Germany ran substantial budget deficits and eventually breached the pact. Some other countries, like Ireland, were enjoying a massive property boom and ran budget surpluses. The IMF, ECB, DG ECFIN, etc, couldn’t have been happier.

So, how’s that working out for you? It’s almost as if those eurosclerotic ol’ social democratic finance ministers from the early Bush age had had a point all along!

And the answer is apparently another Stability Pact, just bigger, badder, and more, with balanced budget clauses and a ban on wage settlements being indexed to inflation. To put it another way, you personally are being asked to trust the ECB to put you out of work if prices look like going up. That’s the only way to deal with inflation!

Things the economic government does not cover include – anything about intra-eurozone trade, anything about macro-prudential bank regulation, anything about unemployment, anything about growth. You might think these are some pretty big issues. But the Merkel-Sarkozy paper doesn’t even mention any of the problems that actually happened. There was a massive housing bubble (nothing) fuelled by spectacularly dodgy banking (nothing) recycling a massive trade surplus (nothing) that led to a huge recession (nothing).

Finally, it’s not actually true that southern Europeans don’t work as hard as Germans. Greeks actually put in more hours. It seems fair to say that the differences are not due to Germany’s vast resource wealth. If it’s not land or labour, it must be either capital – the Germans have more and better tools to work with – or entrepreneurship – German companies are better organised. (Look, this isn’t a controversial statement, is it?) It’s rare that you have to bring your own computer, tractor, machine-tool, or whatever to work. It’s rarer that anyone asks you how you think your workplace should be organised.

But for some reason, the only answer anyone is prepared to offer to the failure of half Europe’s management class is that everyone else should take a pay cut.

Could There Really Be A Recession Risk In Germany?

Oh, come on Edward, surely this time you are going too far? The Germany economy is the strongest in Europe, time and again we have been told it is powering and powering ahead. It has just demonstrated record growth performances. So where the hell could you possibly get the crazy idea that Germany might be in for a double-dip recession? Must be the summer Spanish heat. Continue reading

A Hungarian Waltz On The Wild Side

The Hungarian government’s much publicised unorthodox plans to cut the country’s public debt level has been attracting a lot of attention of late, both from the media and from the rating agencies. Some observers have been quite positively impressed. Fitch Ratings, for example, raised their outlook on Hungary’s sovereign credit rating in early June from negative to stable, citing government plans to reduce what is currently the largest accumulated public debt among the European Union’s eastern members. Others, however, continue to have their doubts. Moody’s, for example, has decided to maintain a negative outlook on the country’s due to concerns about the general trend in government policy, and the possibility of slippage with deficit objectives. Either way, these are changes within very defined margins, since at the end of the dat Fitch currently still rates Hungary at BBB- and Moody’s at Baa3, in both cases these ratings amount to the lowest investment grades. Continue reading

Recession Warning On Europe’s Periphery

As Europe’s leaders struggle to convince markets that their Greek debt problem-resolution-proposals are actually viable, and will really do the trick, last week’s flash PMI readings seem to have attracted rather less attention than they might. Nonetheless, the fact of the matter is that it is steadily becoming clearer that the current slowdown in Eurozone economic growth is turning into something more than just another one of those pesky “soft patches”. The pace of economic expansion in core Europe has slowed dramatically, falling back in July for the third consecutive month, according to the latest flash PMI. Commenting on the flash results Chris Williamson, Chief Economist at Markit said: “The Eurozone recovery lost almost all of its momentum in July, recording the weakest growth since August 2009 when the recovery first began. Excluding the financial crisis, the July survey was the most downbeat since the Iraq war in 2003, and consistent with a flat trend in quarterly gross domestic product.

Continue reading