Category Archives: Transition and accession

Dushanbe Diplomacy

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At this week’s summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Russian president Medvedev was reportedly seeking support for his country’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. If that’s true, he can’t be the mastermind he’s sometimes alleged to be in the conflict between Russia and Georgia.

Surely he knows that “territorial integrity” is one of the PRC’s favorite phrases in the lexicon of contemporary diplomacy. Surely he knows that China sees Tibet as a matter of territorial integrity. Surely he knows that the PRC sees Taiwan as a matter of territorial integrity. He may not know that one of the recurring themes of Chinese history is territorial breakup, but surely he has advisors who do, and who should have told him that asking China to back the undoing of territorial integrity as a norm of interstate relations is asking for a rebuff.

The Organization’s communique split the difference, saying “[We] urge the sides to solve existing problems peacefully, through dialogue, and to make efforts facilitating reconciliation and talks.” They added, “The SCO states welcome the adoption in Moscow on August 12 of six principles of settling the conflict in South Ossetia and support Russia’s active role in contributing to peace and cooperation in the region.” The “active role” has to count as a win for Russia, but the absence of any hint of recognition or support for recognition must surely count as a loss. It’s surprising that Russia sought it at all.

Just Foolish

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There are a lot of bad things about the Georgia-Russia conflict, but this is just foolish: Nearly all Russia-based web sites seem to be blocked from Georgia, and by the Georgian side. Trying to surf to the Moscow Times gets me a domain-parking site, while Izvestiya.ru, just for example, yields a four-line message in Georgian. (Whatever Great Firewall of the Caucasus technology they’re using spills over in weird ways. Yesterday there were periods where I couldn’t get facebook (my productivity soared!) and couldn’t get Google.com but could get Google.de.)

C’mon guys, you’re the underdogs here. The free flow of information is your friend. Cut it out already.

How Frozen is Your Conflict?

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At their meeting in Sochi — planned home of the 2014 Winter Olympics and just a hop, skip and APC ride from Abkhazia — Russia’s president Dmitri Medvedev warned Moldova’s president not to repeat the “Georgian mistake.”

Moldova, of course, claims Transnistria as part of its internationally recognized territory, but has never exercised actual control since the collapse of the Soviet Union. A Soviet Army, the 14th iirc, commanded at the time by Alexander Lebed, helped the Transnistrians enforce their counter-secession from Moldova. Since then, it’s continued its odd trajectory, something of a black hole in international legal term, reputed to be a haven for all manner of criminality and, not incidentally, an irritant to both Moldova and Ukraine.

“After the Georgian leadership lost their marbles, as they say, all the problems got worse and a military conflict erupted,” Medvedev told Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin.

“This is a serious warning, a warning to all,” he added. “And I believe we should handle other existing conflicts in this context.”

Which context? Issuing Russian passports to anyone who asks and then claiming the right to intervene to protect “Russian citizens”?

Message received:

“Frozen conflicts are a real volcano which can blow up anytime,” Voronin added. “That is why taking into account what had happened elsewhere it would be useful if we exercised again such wisdom not to allow such things to repeat in our country.”

The ripples from Georgia are just starting to spread.

Back in Tbilisi

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We’re back after a happily uneventful, if hot and a bit long, drive from Yerevan. Went past one of the air bases that was bombed, and saw what looked like a burned field, but otherwise no damage visible from the public road.

The city itself is more difficult to judge, and I’ve been too preoccupied with personal things to manage to do anything like a general taking stock. Quick impressions: lots of visible police, some with submachineguns prominently held; traffic seemed lighter, but then again it’s mid-August; jets flying by at odd hours in the afternoon. Our corner grocery didn’t have any Parmalat milk; on the other hand, it did have pizza kits. Even under regular circumstances, consistency is not the strong point of the Georgian market. (Winter promises to be more interesting than I really wanted.) Our local swingin hotspot is swingin again, after a couple of very quiet days last week.

Down the street, work seems to be getting close to finished on a small office building. There was a night watchman, and a lot of leftover material was piled at the front so as to block the entrances that are still open. Is this a regular precaution, or are the builders worried about refugee squatters? There are said to be 60,000 refugees in and around the city, and lurid rumors about their attempts to occupy houses and other buildings. Lurid rumors are, in fact, something of a general commodity. Makes me more than usually skeptical.

The default screen on several ATMs that I saw was an appeal for donations to help people from the zones of conflict. A local mobile company was a major vector of organization for the patriotic rallies of this last week. Political mobilization in the 21st century.

We’re glad to be here.

Update: Forgot to mention: There’s a pretty widespread assumption among the internationals that a fair number of phone lines are, shall we say, shared. The three candidates for listening in can be transparently called the Hosts, the Neighbors and the Friends.

Hamlet without the Prince

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In Crawford Texas today for a meeting about the Georgian crisis at George Bush’s home, here’s Condoleezza Rice yet again using an analogy of the Georgian situation with the USSR period –

Now, I think the behavior recently suggests that perhaps Russia has not taken that route [international integration], and either that they have not taken that route or that they would like to have it both ways — that is, that you behave in a 1968 way toward your small neighbors by invading them and, at the same time, you continue to integrate into the political and diplomatic and economic and security structures of the international community. And I think the fact is, you can’t have it both ways.

Perhaps odd here is the equation Russia=USSR and an associated absence of any role for Communism (as it was implemented) in explaining behaviour within the Soviet bloc. It’s an intellectual gap that might escape the notice of politicians but could draw fire from the sort of academic who had written articles with titles like “The Party, the Military, and Decision Authority in the Soviet Union”. And who might such an academic be? Well, an article with that title appeared in World Politics in 1987 under the authorship of a certain C. Rice. The lunacy of academic copyright restrictions makes it impossible to find out more about this intriguing thesis, which apparently is that the Communist party really matters for understanding military decisions from the USSR period. Hopefully a good Sovietologist is around to advise the White House of the problems with transposing that structure to the present situation.

By request: Croatia and the EU

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Right, so I started writing something about Ukraine, Russia and Nato. There wasn’t an issue of time and energy for once, but I discovered couldn’t quite decide what I thought. I see some problems with this concept, but will soldier on…

Bob and SK wonders about Croatia’s EU prospects. Croatia is closer than other prospect countries of becoming members, but the Irish no dashed their hopes of a quick entry. France and some other countries stance here seems pretty indefensible to me, but maybe they’ll relent if the treaty woes goes on long enough. A new report points out what we all knew, that the EU’s ticking along nicely without a new treaty, and two or three more members won’t change that. I don’t know at what point there would be trouble, but my gut feeling is the EU could accommodate more members without paralysis than the EU policy elites seem to think.

In any case, I think Romania and Bulgaria would have maybe benefited from a longer wait, and the same is true of most current candidate countries, maybe even including Croatia.

The Revolution is Over

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It seems clear they done it; for God knows what reason – arrogance, hoping beyond hope, misjudgment – Georgia started something it couldn’t finish. The Russians, for their part, were playing for it for years; the harassment campaign, the motor-rifle regiments parked up on the southern road. But however wrong they were, I’m saddened by it; they believed in the European dream, in joining Sweden and Venice, far more seriously than they did in America in any practical sense.

Russia has Ledeenised the situation – they picked up some crappy little country and threw it against the wall to show they meant business. Vladimir Putin, who presumably spent the autumn of 1989 cursing in the mess at Yasenevo, turned up to take pseudo-charge in the field; the US advisors exited via the pool at the Sheraton. Isn’t it always the pool, at the Sheraton?

As with Ledeenisation 1.0, we didn’t really offer an alternative nor any resistance. Worryingly, a range of other ex-Soviet states lined up to offer their support to Russia; not that they needed Kazakh divisions, but it’s not hard to see which way this is going. Nicolas Sarkozy would have come off this the worst – he flew in, at last, the Western support, and recommended surrender on terms the Prussians of 1870 would have considered tough, but not before making profile with jet, grin, grip etc as the war went on. Worse, he doesn’t even seem to have checked that the terms were sufficiently humiliating before setting out. He didn’t even deliver that. Carlo Levi’s remark that nothing came from Rome but tax collectors and speeches on the radio comes to mind.

It’s a tale of ugliness and failure, all right. I said Sarkozy would have come off this the worst, but then….Bush administration bungling/stupidity/callousness is nothing surprising any more. But this is truly impressive. One of the good things about NATO, after all, is that it’s a lot harder for two member states to a) not tell the other the Russians are coming or b) not tell the other they’re coming for the Russians.

What now? Well, every wind turbine is a vote for independence. And perhaps Hezbollah should start offering military advisors; after all, they know a thing or three about dealing with an enemy on the other side of a hilly border with many tanks.

Georgia and NATO

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The Russian-Georgian war should remind everyone of a very important point regarding NATO and the European Union. Specifically, just as John Lewis Gaddis said about the Cold War, reassurance was as important as deterrence, and this made self-deterrence very important indeed.

NATO members benefited from a common deterrent towards the Soviet Union, but also from reassurance that they wouldn’t face any threats within Europe – one of the reasons NATO militaries spend so much time cooperating in multinational HQs is precisely this. NATO also provided, and provides, a degree of certainty that US, British, and French nuclear weapons are available to deter an attack on other Europeans. But, as Gaddis pointed out, the balance of power was so stable because as well as the prospect of a formidable conventional defence and a devastating nuclear counteroffensive, NATO also offered the Soviet Union confidence that nobody would do anything stupid. Reassurance was as important as deterrence, and its most important form was self-deterrence.

Self-deterrence? Yes. It was a provocative way of saying it, but what was meant was that everyone agreed to observe a policy of non-provocation towards the other side. The results of actually triggering the common deterrent were, after all, so awful that nobody would take the risk. The upshot, in Europe, was that the European club’s entry requirement is as follows: you must hand in your historical baggage to be searched. If they find any irredenta in there, you’ll have to get rid of them before you’re coming in.

So, surely, we all ought to be delighted Georgia didn’t get into NATO. Right? What the hell were they thinking?

There’s a problem here, though; if we assume that Georgia, and specifically Mikhail Saakashvili’s version of it, wasn’t sufficiently responsible (adult, civilised, possibly even white?) to play, how do we explain that Germany got to join in 1955, when a whole great chunk of it was in the other side’s hands? Or Turkey and Greece, who despite being profoundly NATO-integrated regularly use their NATO-standard air defence infrastructure to play cowboys and Indians over the Aegean? One of the reasons for extending membership of NATO, and the EU, has been to reach out first; that it’s better to offer membership, and hope the requirements shape some country’s thinking, than to wait forever for perfection. If this was good enough for Germany, surely it can be good enough for Georgia.

However, it’s a hell of a big risk, and you have to wonder what possible guarantees would have sealed the deal; only a peaceful solution of the frozen conflicts would have been enough to provide NATO with the necessary reassurance that Georgia wouldn’t get them into trouble, and that would have got rid of much of the point of NATO membership for Georgia and also have been politically unacceptable to Georgians. Sometimes there is no good solution, although you have to wonder whether some European power shouldn’t find Georgia a supply of portable anti-tank and surface-to-air missiles, which have the advantage of not being anywhere near as useful aggressively as Grad MLRS batteries.

Karadzic; a one-man fin de siecle

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It’s strange, really; looking back at Radovan Karadzic’s career, the thing that strikes me is how he seems to have recapped most of Europe’s 20th century in his own life, barking his shins on the bits that didn’t fit.

First of all, he wanted to be a romantic poet, itself a dated idea. According to Tim Garton Ash’s interviews with old student friends, he was obsessed by Viennese decadent poets of the 1890s and 1900s, especially Georg Trakl. That atmosphere of stifling conventions and strange new ideas, the motif of curling, growing plants as a symbol for sex and worshipped youth.

Then he thought he would be a psychiatrist. Well, what do you say – it’s not just Freud. Charcot fits in the same period, as does Emil Kraepelin, who founded most of the classical psychiatric diagnoses. Failing the empathy required of psychoanalysis and the rigour of medical psychiatry, what did he do?

Of course, he became a romantic authoritarian nationalist. Like Lanz von Liebenfels and so many others, he worshipped the race and the leader, who would come up like the lifegiving sun of the north when war swept away all that conventional clutter. In his case, the conventional clutter included an awovedly communist state that also practiced free trade and something you could describe as multiculturalism; a total package to provoke an Edwardian/Wilhelmine madman.

And as you might have expected, when he got his hands on the controls, he delivered something very like Europe in the great wars, before going down at the hands of the great world seapowers’ planes and tanks (well, more accurately their light infantry and guns – but people like Karadzic loved to imagine their enemies as degenerate weaklings).

What Henry Said

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What Henry said.

Just one key part of the argument:

Russia sees the spread of democratization as a threat to its control of the ‘Near Abroad.’ It has been pushing quite deliberately for a redefinition of the norms of territorial integrity and intervention that would legitimate its continued presence in Georgia and elsewhere, and allow it to reconsolidate control over what it perceives as its rightful sphere of influence. What it would like to see is tacit or active recognition by other great powers of its right to intervene in countries such as Georgia, the Ukraine, Moldova etc. The Western powers have their own economic interests in the region, which they have been pushing assiduously, but also would quite genuinely would prefer to see democracies consolidate themselves in this band of countries…

But read the whole thing.

Also, while I’ve seen a fair number of comments about Georgian perception of Western support leading to their intransigence in negotiations and preference for a military solution, I haven’t seen as many noting that the South Ossetian leadership has a blank check from Russia and absolutely no need to give even a millimeter in negotiations. It’s certainly relevant to sorting out the dynamics and the motivations.