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But anyway. I don’t think it’s all that useful to compare Kosovo to South Ossetia, but there are lots of people who disagree. So here’s one point of comparison: Kosovo’s independence is recognized by 46 countries. That number looks likely to slowly increase, eventually stabilizing (my guess) at between 50 and 60, including most of Kosovo’s neighbors, most of Europe, and most of the world’s largest economies. South Ossetia is currently recognized by two countries, one of which wants to annex it; that number seems very unlikely to grow beyond single digits.

Where it gets interesting, I think, is the interaction between the two; I suspect that a number of countries who are uncomfortable or undecided about Kosovar independence may use South Ossetia as an excuse to avoid recognizing it, at least for now. These things happen, in diplomacy.

On a related note, I notice that Montenegro’s President / Prime Minister / President Djukanovic is publicly wringing his hands about how much pressure he’s feeling — you know, from The West — to recognize Kosovo. It’s on the B92 site, which means it’s followed by a bunch of commenters screaming at each other. (B92 is a great site, but its English-language site has some of the dumbest commenters anywhere. Lots of Serb and Albanian diasporids, need I say more?) What’s interesting is that all these people seem to be taking Djukanovic’s statement at face value. Which suggests that none of them know very much about Djukanovic or the odd little country he’s been running for 16 of the last 18 years.

Djukanovic is a canny, amoral opportunist running a deeply divided country. Montenegrin nationalism still exists uncomfortably alongside Serb nationalism; anyone who’s spent time with Montenegrins knows that they can simultaneously insist that (1) they are totally different from Serbs, with their own distinct and heroic history and a totally unique culture; but also (2) they are, of course, Serbs. The picture is further complicated by the fact that about 15% - 20% of Montenegro’s population is ethnic minorities — Albanians, Bosniaks, and a few Turks and Croats. These groups supported secession from Serbia a couple of years ago; today, they strongly support recognizing Kosovo. And they’re a key bloc of swing votes.

So, Djukanovic has to walk a very narrow line here. He cares very little about foreign pressure, but he cares a lot about staying in power, maintaining political order, and keeping the money and perks flowing to himself, his family and his friends. So, wailing that he doesn’t really want to recognize Kosovo but, you know, he’s being forced to is probably the cleverest way to handle this. It plays nicely into the whole helpless-victim mindset of Serb nationalists while allowing him to keep the minorities and their MPs on board. In other words, it’s pretty classic Djukanovic… and it probably means Montenegro will be recognizing Kosovo in the not-too-distant future.

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This means that the Radicals are simply unacceptable to most of the international community. This in turn means that, because the Radicals consistently claim around a quarter of the popular vote, Serbia has to keep forming weird coalition governments in order to not incude them. (It’s worse than it sounds because of the way voting in Serbia works. About a fifth [correction -- more like a twentieth] of all votes get wasted because they’re for parties that don’t reach a 5% cutoff for representation in Parliament. So, when seats in Parliament are awarded, the Radicals take not a quarter but more like a third.)

So the Radicals have been a huge headache — not so much to the international community as to other Serbian politicians. The fact that they’re really obnoxious in opposition, throwing lots of brickbats and mugging for the cameras without ever offering constructive help, is just gravy.

Until this week. When Radical leader Seselj went off to the Hague, he appointed his deputy Tomislav Nikolic to lead the party in his absence. Which Nikolic has loyally done for the last several years.

But last week Nikolic had enough. The details are unclear — at least to me — but it looks like Seselj, or someone, went over his head to give instructions to the party’s MPs on how to vote on Serbia’s SAA agreement. (Which is another long and fascinating story in itself. Maybe later.) Whereupon Nikolic stepped down as party leader.

Nikolic’s official explanation is that he “has his dignity”, which presumably is politician-ese for “I’m tired of being overruled and ignored by a guy who’s been in a jail cell for the last five and a half years.” However, it’s worth keeping in mind that, in those five and a half years, Nikolic has lost a whole bunch of elections. Being leader of the opposition — again — probably isn’t looking so good. So, why not separate himself from the stink of flop sweat (hey, those lost elections weren’t his fault! He’s a very attractive candidate!) and do something more interesting?

Which he has: Nikolic has formed his own political club, “Forward Serbia”. And so far, 11 out of the 78 Radical MPs have peeled off to join him.

It’s unclear what “political club” means here. It would be difficult, and possibly unconstitutional, for Nikolic to form his own political party. Serbia, like many former Communist countries, used to have a big problem with MPs hopping from party to party. So the current Serbian constitution allows the parties to enforce loyalty — for instance, by having members sign undated letters of resignation, which the party leadership can hold. So Nikolic can’t really form a new party — but he can form a “club”, which presumably will vote as it pleases, and may perhaps develop its own organization and finances. And might perhaps evolve into a new party, if they can negotiate the legal issues.

The new Radical Party leadership isn’t happy about this, of course, but there’s not much they can do. Nikolic announced — I am not making this up — that he had “lost” the unsigned resignation letters. (Remember, he was the party’s leader. So he was the guy holding them for safekeeping. Whoops.) It’s unclear whether “Forward Serbia” will become a new party, or will just be a loudly disaffected Siamese twin to the Radicals. But either way, it’s a major hassle for them.

There hasn’t been much attention or response to this yet from the rest of the world. And I don’t know how it’s playing out among Serbian watches. (Commenters?)

But speaking only for myself? Popcorn, please.

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First, the football. (Americans may want to skip the next few paragraphs.)

Over a year ago,Armenia and Turkey both got picked to be in Group 5 (Europe) for the 2010 World Cup.

Brief summary for Americans: the World Cup is every four years. About 170 countries want to be in it, but there are only 31 slots. So for the next two years, that 170 will get relentlessly whittled down.

Those 31 slots? One is for the host country (South Africa) and the others are divided by region. So, Europe gets 13 slots, Asia gets five, and so forth. There are 53 European countries competing for those 13 slots. So, those 53 teams have just been divided into nine qualifying groups - eight of six teams and one of five. The winners of each European group will qualify for the World Cup finals, and the best eight runners-up will play off for the other four berths.

It’s complicated, but basically fair — the draw for the qualifying groups is totally random. This can lead to interestingly weird situations, such as the occasional “Group of Death” when three excellent teams are squeezed together. And in this case, it’s put Turkey and Armenia — who don’t have diplomatic relations and who, to put it nicely, don’t much like each other — in the same group.

The odds of this were about one in ten (once Armenia was drawn for Group 5, what were the chances of Turkey being in that group too? Five other slots in the group, 52 other countries — 5/52, or about 9.8%), so it’s not that surprising. But it means Armenia and Turkey have to play each other twice, once at home, and once away. The first of those two games is this weekend, in Armenia.

So: a year ago, Armenia discovered it had to either suck it up and host the Turks, or forfeit the games. The previous Armenian administration — President Robert Kocharian — sucked it up, albeit reluctantly. They said they’d follow the rules to the letter, and provide security, and all, but they weren’t going to like it. Certainly there was no hint of making the Turks welcome.

But! Kocharian left office in April (after some unpleasantness, some of which was discussed on this blog) and was replaced by his Defense Minister, Serge Sarksyan. And President Sarksyan has taken a different position. He has made it clear that his administration would be delighted to host the Turkish team and any other prominent Turk who cared to come along. He’s made that statement concrete in several ways, including waiving visas for Turkish visitors. Not that Armenia has ever had a lot of Turkish visitors, what with not having diplomatic relations and the border being closed and all, but they did require visas for any there might have been. Now they won’t.

Why? We-ell, I didn’t understand Armenian politics when I lived there — these people ltaught Byzantine politics to the Byzantines — but to simplify a hideously complex story, Kocharian was pandering to the nationalist party while Sarksyan thinks he can throw it overboard. Oh, and also Sarksyan’s administration started with a huge PR fiasco, viz., shooting unarmed protestors in the streets of the capital. That got the international community… well, “outraged” is much too strong, but “vaguely unhappy” would probably cover it. So a sudden dramatic act of diplomatic magnanimity is a good idea right now.

Finally, there’s Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia’s long territorial dispute with neighbor Azerbaijan. Both sides have been stubborn and stupid, but right now Armenia has more to lose. Turkey has strongly supported Azerbaijan — not surprising, since Azeris are basically Turks — but now might be a good time for Armenia to look for some daylight between these two allies.

And then of course the war in Georgia. Both Turkey and Armenia have been seriously inconvenienced by this, albeit in different ways. Turkey is worried about its oil pipeline through Georgia, and also about Russia’s heavy-handed reminders about the 1936 Black Sea Convention. (Long story.) Armenia is worried because, with the Turkish and Azeri borders closed, almost all their imports and exports go through Georgia. Armenians are very pro-Russian (while Turks tip a bit towards Georgia), but the war has dramatically reminded Armenia just how vulnerable they are as long as those borders are closed.

All that said, this is still bizarre and awesome. It’s bizarre because Armenians have a couple of million good reasons to hate the Turks, while the Turks have spent the last 90 years or so trying to convince themselves otherwise. The genocide is still the central fact of Armenian history, and the Turks are still denying it. It’s fair to say that Armenians in Armenia are less freaked by this than Armenians in the diaspora, but that’s not saying much. It’s a huge, huge deal.

It’s awesome because, well, it is. Sooner or later someone has to reach out. Maybe nothing will come of it. Probably nothing will come of it. And maybe the reasons are short-sighted or banal. But still: an attempt is being made. That’s really something.

Okay, just so we don’t end on that note, let’s go back to football. Group 5 is sort of a Group of Death, you know? It has one international powerhouse, Spain, and two plausible contenders, Belgium and Turkey. Bosnia and Armenia… well. So figure that Spain will take first place, and whoever wins the Belgium-Turkey game will try to win one of the five second-place slots.

This means that, if Armenia could somehow eke out a draw — never mind a win — they’d probably spike Turkey’s World Cup chances. And probably not do the Turkish-Armenian reconciliation process much good, either.

We’ll see soon enough!

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One of the accompanying web sites is at stoprussia.org, but the version at stoprussia.ge is much more graphic. Unfortunately, and perhaps typically, the English version of the .ge site is nearly devoid of text — the history and news sections were blank when I checked yesterday.

In a bit of technological recursiveness, the tv pictures are showing people on the streets taking videos and snapping pictures with their phone cams.

Just saw a guy walk by in a t-shirt with Ukrainian national emblems. Too early, dude. This is Georgia. Ukraine’s not due up just yet. Another person holding a big Georgian flag, with small Polish and Lithuanian flags. The friends and exemplars.

To be sure, the action has official sanction and support, but it’s also genuinely popular. I’ve seen flags all across the three neighborhoods I’ve been in today, and I don’t think it’s the greengrocer effect.

Video now from other parts of Georgia, where similar rallies are happening. Obviously this sort of mobilization would have been more effective before the military losses last month. On the other hand, there might not have been the broad-based unity without the losses. And even a persistent national mobilization wouldn’t have done anything to convince the S. Ossetian and Abkhazian leaderships to consent to rule from Tbilisi. With a blank check from Moscow, who needs compromise?

Pissed off older woman now burning her Russian passport for the camera. My Georgian is nonexistent, but it isn’t hard to guess what she’s saying. (Video later from another city, people in the background chanting “Ivan go home!” in English. I thought I was being at least a little hyperbolic above. Pictures have also come through from Poti, Gori and Batumi. Now a guy in a suit reporting from Brussels, where various things are presumably being promised.)

Getting rid of a Russian occupation is tough going even in the best of times, with a Kremlin leadership that’s willing to pull back. With the current crew, who knows how long they’ll stick around?

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