The monopolarist recession

For a while now I’ve had a private theory about the way our world used to work. It goes like this: although communism may have been bad for the people of Russia (and of the Soviet satellite states), it did a useful job in keeping the west honest through negative example. Free speech? Yes, we in the west have that. Imprisonment without trial? No, that would be evil and wrong. Peace through international treaties? Naturally. As long as communism was going on, a sense that it would be better to be on the side of the angels permeated western society, its institutions, and its way of conducting relations abroad.

Anyway, I don’t expect that this suggestion won’t be falsified through multiple counter-example, and all to the muffled sound of laughter. But I thought it might give some colour to the background of this week’s events. For one, we have the French president in Moscow, brokering some sort of deal in which the Russians agree to (mostly) stop moving their tanks in the direction of the Georgian capital. Today we have the German chancellor meeting Medvedev in Sochin. And Condoleeza Rice, the US foreign policy chief, is in Tbilisi to show the Aghmashenebeli the surrender document he doesn’t know he’s already signed. It looks more like peer cooperation to me, and not so much like the dismal, chauvinist picture of a monopolar world that kept getting pushed our way circa Iraq.

Georgia and NATO

The Russian-Georgian war should remind everyone of a very important point regarding NATO and the European Union. Specifically, just as John Lewis Gaddis said about the Cold War, reassurance was as important as deterrence, and this made self-deterrence very important indeed.

NATO members benefited from a common deterrent towards the Soviet Union, but also from reassurance that they wouldn’t face any threats within Europe – one of the reasons NATO militaries spend so much time cooperating in multinational HQs is precisely this. NATO also provided, and provides, a degree of certainty that US, British, and French nuclear weapons are available to deter an attack on other Europeans. But, as Gaddis pointed out, the balance of power was so stable because as well as the prospect of a formidable conventional defence and a devastating nuclear counteroffensive, NATO also offered the Soviet Union confidence that nobody would do anything stupid. Reassurance was as important as deterrence, and its most important form was self-deterrence.

Self-deterrence? Yes. It was a provocative way of saying it, but what was meant was that everyone agreed to observe a policy of non-provocation towards the other side. The results of actually triggering the common deterrent were, after all, so awful that nobody would take the risk. The upshot, in Europe, was that the European club’s entry requirement is as follows: you must hand in your historical baggage to be searched. If they find any irredenta in there, you’ll have to get rid of them before you’re coming in.

So, surely, we all ought to be delighted Georgia didn’t get into NATO. Right? What the hell were they thinking?

There’s a problem here, though; if we assume that Georgia, and specifically Mikhail Saakashvili’s version of it, wasn’t sufficiently responsible (adult, civilised, possibly even white?) to play, how do we explain that Germany got to join in 1955, when a whole great chunk of it was in the other side’s hands? Or Turkey and Greece, who despite being profoundly NATO-integrated regularly use their NATO-standard air defence infrastructure to play cowboys and Indians over the Aegean? One of the reasons for extending membership of NATO, and the EU, has been to reach out first; that it’s better to offer membership, and hope the requirements shape some country’s thinking, than to wait forever for perfection. If this was good enough for Germany, surely it can be good enough for Georgia.

However, it’s a hell of a big risk, and you have to wonder what possible guarantees would have sealed the deal; only a peaceful solution of the frozen conflicts would have been enough to provide NATO with the necessary reassurance that Georgia wouldn’t get them into trouble, and that would have got rid of much of the point of NATO membership for Georgia and also have been politically unacceptable to Georgians. Sometimes there is no good solution, although you have to wonder whether some European power shouldn’t find Georgia a supply of portable anti-tank and surface-to-air missiles, which have the advantage of not being anywhere near as useful aggressively as Grad MLRS batteries.

Obama in Berlin

Can’t find any pictures yet, but I’ve seen blogs of people coming up from Prague just to see him. That’s about a five-hour trip each way by train (no ICE connection yet). Expectations on the radio this morning were that the event would be huge.

Wish I could be there, but we’re getting packed up to move to Tbilisi, Georgia. Which of course means no more TV, so here are streams from German media. The top one will have commentary in German; the lower says it is in uncommented English. Speech starts at 18.50; presumably the streams will begin a bit before.

Update: Screen cap from ARD. The stream is spotty, wonder if the online flash crowd is too big?

Who wants to see Obama?

Who wants to see Obama?

Ok, this is huge.

The German Plot Against French!

An interesting post at Language Log, about the position of minority languages/dialects in France. Traditionally, France before the Revolution was more of a geographical expression than a state in the modern sense, to adapt the famous phrase about pre-Bismarckian Germany. Highly diverse regions, with little in common except allegiance to a distant Parisian king; the revolution changed all that, or more specifically, the 19th century did, with the army’s numbered, nationally-recruited regiments, the uniform school curriculum, the administrative structure of prefects and subprefects all answering to the same ministry in Paris.

So, the very idea of a minority speech is quite a difficult one for a state that is still very, very centralised. Just how difficult this is for some people can be measured by the response of Jean-Claude Monneret, a member of the Academy, no less:

… [T]outes les langues n’ont pas la même dignité. […] [O]n ne peut mettre sur le même plan ce qui est une grande langue de culture et un dialecte appauvri. Existe-t-il un Rousseau en occitan, un Tocqueville en basque, un Balzac en ch’ti …, un Stendhal en breton, un Montesquieu en catalan? (“All languages do not have the same worthiness. […] We can’t put on the same level a great language of culture and an impoverished dialect. Is there a Rousseau in Occitan, a Tocqueville in Basque, a Balzac in Ch’ti …, a Montesquiue in Catalan?”)

And you thought you couldn’t have colonialism in one country. Of course, Montesquieu and Rousseau lived before the Revolution, so didn’t do their army service or go to one of Jules Ferry’s schools by definition. And Rousseau was Swiss; so what kind of French did either of them actually speak, as opposed to writing? I don’t know; but this seems incredibly anti-scholarly, as if we just assumed Shakespeare spoke BBC English.

Cette question des langues régionales en Europe est aussi à penser dans le cadre d’une géopolitique bruxelloise d’inspiration germanique. Il y a aujourd’hui en Europe des groupes d’intérêt qui militent pour un reformatage de l’Europe sur un modèle politique impérial. La manoeuvre qui consiste à encourager la reconnaissance de toutes les langues minoritaires n’est qu’un leurre, une stratégie oblique qui vise en fait à déconstruire, à détricoter les nations européennes autres que l’Allemagne, qui toutes incorporent des groupes d’appartenance linguistiquement minoritaires.

Ainsi, subtilement, on ne s’attaque pas frontalement aux États, mais on commence par une reconnaissance linguistique. C’est très «démocratique», ça semble n’engager à rien. Mais à partir de là, c’est le toboggan.

(“This question of regional languages in Europe should also be considered in the context of a German-inspired geopolitical initiative in Brussels. Today in Europe there are interest groups who agitate for reforming Europe on an imperial political model. The manoeuvre of encouraging the recognition of all minority languages is just a decoy, an oblique strategy that in fact aims to deconstruct, to de-knit European nations other than Germany, who all include groups belonging to linguistic minorities.

Thus, subtly, one doesn’t attack the member states directly, but one begins with linguistic recognition. This is very “democratic”, it doesn’t seem to amount to anything. But after that, it’s a slippery slope.”)

Wow. That’s pretty damn crazy…but the interesting bit to me is the assumption that Germany is linguistically homeogenous and a centralised, unitary state. To believe that, you need to know absolutely nothing whatsoever about German, German history, or the current German state. It is not difficult to find bits of Germany where you might need to ask people to speak hochdeutsch; it’s happened to me. And Germany is the most federal state in Europe after Switzerland; even the Wilhelmine empire was so federal that each Land had its own army, even if this didn’t mean much in practice as only the Prussians had a general staff.

Particularism is still a major force in German (and EU) politics today; the minister-president of Baden-Wurttemberg practically ran his own foreign policy through the European Convention, as I recall. So what planet is this guy on?

Privacy Chernobyl in Bonn

That gaggle of elite geeks who have been arguing against the horrible possibilities an internetworked world offers to fraudsters and state bullies for years have often said that one day, there’ll be a horrible crunch. A disastrous moment of truth. As Chernobyl finished the reputation of nuclear power for 20 years, the Privacy Chernobyl will kibosh all those monster database schemes for the foreseeable future. The subtext is perhaps that whatever the damage may be, it’s the collateral damage we have to accept to stop the bastards overrunning us.

What if, however, the first people to catch it were pompous German executives? Some would fear this wouldn’t draw any moral reaction from the public – who cares what happens to the bastards? Others might think it’s precisely their outrage that would finish the buggers quickest. It seems, though, that the Privacy Chernobyl might already have happened, in Germany. Scandal has been raging around Deutsche Telekom for a while; the monster telco, one-third state-owned, has been caught spying on members of its supervisory board, and much worse, journalists and trade union reps. Der Spiegel burst the story, interviewing the boss of a Berlin information security firm that was given the raw data from DTAG’s systems to analyse. He’s singing like a canary. DTAG promised that it was all over by the time the current CEO took over, but it turned out that the security firm was receiving money years later, money that came from the same cost-centre as the CEO’s office.

But this is far from the worst that might have happened. It wasn’t so much the content of the calls that was being spied upon, but rather their metadata. This is something one learns quickly on joining the telecoms industry – it’s the signalling that matters. The SS7 signalling traffic on a mobile network contains a treasure of information on who telephones, with whom, and from which geographic locations. Matching the dumps of data, they would have been able to trace the movements of the targets, their social networks, and who they met with.

It gets worse. Last week, Der Spiegel revealed that Lufthansa had also trawled its frequent flyer files in order to find out who a particular hack was getting information from. The real killer was, though, the suggestion that the two companies’ security departments might have swapped data – it turns out there is a strong old boys’ network between the security organisations German industry set up during the extreme-left terrorism of the 1970s, and something like a black market in database tables. Lufthansa’s frequent flyer programme offers benefits on all kinds of other stuff, including railway tickets and their own virtual mobile phone operator (MVNO), and a credit card – there’s a lot there already, but the kicker is that most big German companies outsource their expenses management to the same Lufthansa division that runs the loyalty scheme. And the journos were run through the same analysis.

Quite possibly, an entire corporate elite’s movements, communications, and tastes may be compromised. Everyone involved is already in the deep shit, as the rights to privacy and to freedom of the press are guaranteed by the German constitution, to say nothing of the ordinary law. If the radioactive smoke isn’t already billowing over the countryside, the containment vessel is bulging and glowing.

But there’s an odd detail here – T-Mobile USA refused to participate in illegal surveillance operations, like Qwest and no other US telcos. I have always believed that the reason for this was that T-Mobile, alone among telcos, has on-network transatlantic roaming. Due to the fundamental principles of GSM, T-Mobile subscribers from Germany, Holland, the UK, or indeed any other T-Mobile network in Europe, would have been spied on in the US with the involvement of T-Mobile in their home country, because their Home Location Register (HLR) would have been queried for every network transaction that occurred in the US. (It’s the signalling, remember.) This would have obviously had very serious legal consequences back in Europe.

Zurück durch Technik

Another Euro 2008 open thread but one in which we feel compelled to note how tonight’s match was an insight to the central role of television in the experience — as evidenced by how flat things went (at least where I was watching) when the global TV feed apparently collapsed for significant portions of the second half, including the 2-1 and 2-2 goals.  At least it was back in time for Lahm’s emphatic finish on the winner.

And then, a LIBRARY!

The German newspaper whose website could be better organised has a very good article about the Gurtel, Vienna’s other great boulevard, once described as the proletarian Ringstrasse. I never knew this, though:

Wobei auf dem Gürtel früher Linksverkehr herrschte, wie in England. Siegfried Tschmul, ein Wiener Jude, erinnert sich gut daran. Als er 1938, nachdem die deutschen Truppen in Wien einmarschiert waren, eines Morgens aus seinem Fenster hinunter auf den Währinger Gürtel sah, fuhren alle Autos plötzlich rechts, wie in Deutschland. Über Nacht war der gesamte Verkehr umgestellt worden, und niemand hatte ein Problem mit der neuen Ordnung. Da sei ihm klar geworden, dass er Wien verlassen musste. Mit seinen Eltern floh er aus Österreich.

They used to drive on the left? Who knew? And the image of everyone suddenly driving on the right, the morning after the Nazi seizure of power, is better than any novelist could have invented. I liked this, too:

Denn die Rotlichtszene, lange untrennbar mit dem Gürtel verbunden, verliert ihr Publikum, vor allem dort, wo der Gürtel so schick und quirlig geworden ist. Eine der Unterweltgrößen, in Wien “Strizzis” genannt, hat den Sittenverfall schon in einem Interview beklagt. Erst seien die Stadtbahnbögen ausgeräumt und Kulturzentren eingerichtet worden. Und dann hätten sie ihm auch noch “eine Bibliothek hingebaut”.

What did the porno boss find most offensive? The library, damn it.

Oh Dear Oh Dear

The Georgians may have lost two more UAVs in the escalating crisis between them, Abkhazia, and Russia (in so far as the latter two are distinct). At least, the Abkhaz side is claiming that their “anti-aircraft forces” shot down two drones, presumably Georgian ones; the Georgians deny it, which is interesting because they were keen to publicise the last such incident. Back on the 20th of April, the Georgians lost another UAV to a MiG-29 fighter – subtext, to the Russians, as no-one seriously believes Abkhazia operates an independent air force and certainly not one equipped with modern fighters. (They claim to have some Czech-made L39 fighter/trainers.) You can see the video here, complete with MiG-29 and missile.

Shootings-down of aircraft are always overclaimed, so it’s possible that everyone is wrong. The Russians suggested that the video actually shows a “NATO MiG-29″ (which isn’t actually impossible – Germany has some left over from the DDR), but no-one is convinced. If today’s statement is true, one has to wonder what the Georgians are up to as well – the drones in question are rather expensive Israeli Elbit Hermes-450s, and Georgia has only a couple of dozen. If they are deliberately testing the other side or seeking a provocation, they must really mean it.

Alexander von Humboldt Ate My Hamster

This post reminded me a lot of Vienna University in 2001-2002; I was there as a SOCRATES student, still actually a member of the Labour Party, while the strange times we live in began. I also first encountered the word “blog” around about then, and indeed visited the Blogger front page, but for some reason I didn’t take the jump to actually get blogging; I therefore bear some responsibility for Instapundit’s undeserved fame.

What do I remember, of the pre-Bologna German university? Well, one thing was the teaching staff, or rather their absence; you could go literally weeks without seeing your professor outside the huge lectures, but why would you want to? Their pompous titles were only matched by their pomposity in general. This didn’t go so much for the postgraduate assistants, but then, there’s only so often you actually want a row about Trotsky…

Another thing was the distinctive Austrian combination of bureaucracy and chaos. It took literally months to complete the process of registration, but it wasn’t as if anyone cared – I often wondered how many of my fellow students bothered to register at all, and how many weren’t even planning to graduate. This Gormenghast atmosphere was only reinforced by the fact I had lectures in the main university building on Dr. Karl Lueger Ring; within the 1870s Italianate monster was a world of high ceilings and flaking plaster, lectures where so many people were packed in the hall that I recall sitting behind a projection booth with my back to the lecturer.

In the entrance hall, there is a huge stone first world war memorial which is kept concealed by noticeboards because it’s ideologically significant to the Burschenschafter on one hand, and the political science crowd on the other. There was a weekly confrontation between the two groups next to it; what with the FPO and Co, we spent a lot of time demonstrating in one way or other. Above all, there was a sense of an academic life left behind, after the ideas and the people had moved on; the plaque commemorating Moritz Schlick, the philosopher murdered during a lecture by a Nazi student, just dramatised this.

Now, partly this was all sui generis. I would guess things were very different down the road at the TU with the engineers. But I do think it represents something like an extreme version of the German system, or rather its (powerful) humanities-plus-Staatsexamen wing. And I wouldn’t feel too nostalgic for it.

But I will, however, remember very well the excellent course which shadowed the European Convention process, protesting on the Ring, telling Robert Menasse he was an idiot…