About Edward Hugh

Edward 'the bonobo' is a Catalan economist of British extraction. After being born, brought-up and educated in the United Kingdom, Edward subsequently settled in Barcelona where he has now lived for over 15 years. As a consequence Edward considers himself to be "Catalan by adoption". By inclination he is a macro economist, but his obsession with trying to understand the economic impact of demographic changes has often taken him far from home, off and away from the more tranquil and placid pastures of the dismal science, into the bracken and thicket of demography, anthropology, biology, sociology and systems theory. All of which has lead him to ask himself whether Thomas Wolfe was not in fact right when he asserted that the fact of the matter is "you can never go home again".

Latvia: The Demographic Price Of Procrastination

One of the things I think we can safely say about the impact of the current economic crisis is that the face of Macro Economic theory will never be the same again. Quite what the macro economics of the future will look like is too early to say, but what is clear enough is that the existing corpus has been tested and found wanting: it’s predictive capacity is very, very limited, and this is obviously a far from satisfactory situation.

At the same time, new ideas, and new perspectives are emerging. I have already spoken earlier this morning about the key issue of “non linearities” in the context of Jordi Molins’ discussion of the weaknesses of the stress test methodology. Claus has spoken about some of the issues raised by the attempt to put macro theory on micro foundations, and now I would like to present an important, if little known, piece of research coming from Latvia – one of the canaries in the coal-mine on the whole Eurozone sovereign debt issue. Eliana Marino’s work is both extremely interesting and extraordinarily important, since what it illustrates is the negative feedback mechanism that can be activated by having an “L” shaped non-recovery in a rapidly ageing society with extremely low underlying fertility. What Eliana did was something macro economists seldom consider doing, she carried out some qualitative research, rather than running a computer model, to find out just what was happening on the ground.

The resulting survey, which she personally conducted in Riga from September to December 2009 and which involved some of the leading Latvian experts on migration issues, lead her to estimate that around 30,000 people may well have left Latvia in 2009 and the same number are likely to follow them in 2010. These numbers are considerably greater than the official register shows. As she argues these large emigration flows from Latvia will have a significant effect on the future demographic and economic path of the country, creating serious problems of labour shortage, unsustanability of the pension system and accelerating the already significant population decline.

And just why may Latvia be a canary down the coal-mine in this context? Well think about Spain, where the housing boom attracted in the best part of 6 million people – in a country where the rate of natural change in the population was stagnant. Now imagine that with 20% unemployment as the continuing outlook for the country over the best part of the next decade, what might happen there. People could vote with their feet, and the population could contract just as rapidly as it grew, leaving that 1.5 million currently unsellable housing units even more unsellable than ever. The warning signs are there. The number of those contributing to the social security system continues to stagnate, even as unemployment remains unchanged, so where are the people? Some have obviously found their way into the growing informal economy, but others have surely left, and there is plenty of anecdotal evidence to support this idea. In addition, the rate of new household formation turned negative in the first quarter, for the first time in the series history.

At the end of the day, the truth of the matter is that we really don’t know what is happening in Spain, so would the Spanish Eliana Marino please kindly step forward? Continue reading

Interpreting The Stress Tests

Evidently there is now a considerable debate out there about the famous (or should that be infamous) CEBS stress tests. Methodologically all sorts of weaknesses have been identified, but in many cases these are decidedly beside the point. It is important to be aware what the tests were (and weren’t) designed to show. They were, it seems to me, essentially designed to free up lending in the short term European interbank market, nothing more, nothing less. This would be useful since it would enable the ECB to step out of playing this particular role. And it may well happen, since if everyone can agree that no European bank is going to fail tomorrow, or be allowed to fail tomorrow, then there should be no difficulty for one bank to lend to another for 24 hours, and so on.

But this issue is a quite separate one from the longer term funding needs of the Spanish banking system, for example, or from the longer term solvency of Greek sovereign debt, where a large quantity of asset backed securities of one kind or another need to be re-financed in the months and years to come. This is a much more complicated issue, since no one has a really very clear idea of the longer term value of the securities which back the pieces of paper, either in the Spanish or the Greek cases, and the stress tests have done nothing to resolve this issue. And that is not surprising, since they were never intended to serve that purpose.

What the tests have I think made reasonably clear is that no EU bank or sovereign will be allowed to fail between now and the end of 2011. They will not be allowed to fail, quite simply because the ECB and the European Financial Stability Facility are there to guarantee that they don’t. So something is something. The Eurozone was created without due care and attention being paid to the kind of institutional backdrop which would be required to support it if things went wrong. Now things certainly have gone wrong – in ways which I think were perfectly forseeable, but let’s not push that one too hard right now – and we are in the process of putting some of the institutional support in place. Like Gaudi’s famous Sagrada Familia, what we have is a work in progress, with no evident end-date in sight, and no detailed blueprint of what the thing will finally look like. Debate about the future is, as they say, “ongoing”, and the situation is “fluid”.

At the same time issues about the per se usefulness of the kinds of tests the CEBS have just carried out remain, and continue to be legitimate areas of discussion. Some people have spoken about the likelihood of tail risk events (not forseen in the stress tests). But to some extent even this argument misses the point, since I am not sure that what we are talking about are “tail risks” in a situation like the Spanish or Greek one. The kind of cascading scenario (debt snowball, for example) we could see actually forms part of what anyone with a solid grasp of the underlying macro should actually expect to happen if no one does something to ensure it doesn’t, for the simple reason that all the various economic agents are effectively “inter-linked”, so when one part of the system goes down, then the rest can come crashing down behind it. And this is what will almost inevitably happen if someone, somewhere doesn’t find a way to revert the Spanish and Greek economies to a sustainable growth path.

With this in mind, and with due regard to the fact that most of the models conventional economists and financial analysts work with make all kinds of “linearity” assumptions when in fact many of the processes involved are decidedly non-linear, and subject to various kinds of interconnectedness issues and feedback loops, I though it might be useful to reproduce here an argument to this effect recently made by my friend, the Catalan economist Jordi Molins. So without more fuss or flourish, here its is. Continue reading

Under Stress

After a long and rather tense wait, the initial response to the publication of the European bank stress tests was always going to be something of an anti-climax. Indeed the results should hardly have comes as a surprise to anyone It is hardly breaking news to learn that a number of Spanish cajas will find themselves badly undercapitalised if the economic recovery – as surely might be expected – fails to materialise as planned. For the rest, the outcome is really a victory for politically correct: thinking. The situation, we learn, is slightly more serious than previously acknowleged, but we are a long way from seeing the imminent collapse of the European financial system. How could we be, when we have the friendly face of the ECB, always there ready to offer a helping hand. Continue reading

Oh It’s All Gone Quiet Over In The Eurozone!

Or has it? According to Anchalee Worrachate in Bloomberg:

“A report from the Bank of Spain showed Spanish lenders borrowed a record 126.3 billion euros ($161 billion) from the ECB in June as investors shunned the nation’s banks. Spain’s banks increased borrowing 48 percent from 85.6 billion euros in May. That compares with a drop of 4 percent to 496.6 billion euros that the ECB provided lenders in the whole euro area. Spanish banks haven’t sold any bonds publicly in the past two months on concern the nation won’t be able to cut its deficit without hurting the economy.”

Pretty hard to argue now the Spanish bank borrowing from the ECB is simply in line with the country’s share of total GDP I would have thought. Also, after having trended upwards ever so slightly for a couple of months, Spain’s industrial output actually fell back again in May (by 0.3%) while output in Germany roared ahead by 2.9%. Obviously not everyone is getting the same benefit from the weaker euro, could competitiveness have anything to do with it, I wonder?

Quoted in the Financial Times earlier today Klaus Regling, chief executive of the European Financial Stability Facility said the fund would be “ready to act whenever the politicians tell us to act.” I guess the situation of Spain’s banks would be one of the things he must have had in mind.

Using a footballing analogy, you get to see a lot in the press about how this club is chasing this player, while that one is chasing another one, until the moment of the actually negotiations comes. Somehow, at that point the sporting press goes strangely silent.

Of course, when those much talked of stress test finally come out, we’ll all be able to see for ourselves that Spain’s banks – apart from a few ropey old Cajas that no one in their right mind would be interested in anyway – are in absolutely sterling and tip top condition (and not like their shabby German counterparts at all). Won’t we José (Viñals)?

Or are those reponsible for the Spanish banking system finally going to face up to their responsibilities, amble out of that closet they have been tightly locked away inside for the last three years, and follow the advice of Jacques Cailloux, chief European economist at RBS, by seizing opportunity provided by this months “getting it all out in the open” fest to start restoring investor confidence by really getting down to straightening out the mess? Continue reading

Is There Global Economic Slowdown In The Works?

According to Ralph Atkins writing in the Financial Times last week, “the pace of Germany’s recovery is helping dispel fears of a “double dip” recession across the continent as a result of the crisis over public finances in southern European countries”. Coincidentally, however, on the very same day, Alan Beattie writing from Washington informed us that the IMF feel “the risk of a slowdown in the global economic recovery has risen sharply”. This left me asking myself which is it: is the global recovery a question of up up and away, or are we at the start of a renewed slowdown (whether or not you wish to term this a “double-dip”)? So I thought I would take a look through some of the most recent data (both hard and soft) to see if I could make any sense of the situation. Continue reading

Croatia: On The Brink of What?

As Croatia enters the final stage of its EU membership talks, it is perhaps a fitting moment to review the other half of the picture, namely where the Croatian economy finds itself, and what the outlook might be for a continuing convergence with the requirements of Euro membership. Understandably, EU officials are fairly cautious about the likely shape and progress of the forthcoming talks (the Union has, after all got rather a lot on its plate at the moment), but Croatian Prime Minister Jadranka Kosor is decidedly more optimistic, since while she recognises that this last phase is likely to be “really difficult and demanding” she still believes that negotiations could be concluded by the end of the year, which would mean that membership in 2012 would become a possibility. Continue reading

Migration Flows and Economic Sustainability In The Baltics

Here’s the third in the series of paper abstracts submitted to the Bologna conference in 2007 and which weren’t considered sufficiently interesting to be selected for presentation. This time the topic is migration and the Baltics, and the authors are Aapo Markkenen and Claus Vistesen. (for the two previous abstracts, and more about what this is all about, see here, and here). Evidently the subject is still highly topical. Only last Friday the Wall Street Journal had an article of the growing problem of human capital exodus in Greece. It is very important that people understand that when it comes to economic processes, no decision is ever completely free. There are always on-costs of some kind or another. In this case, a failure to act vigourously enough to restore competitiveness simply means that employment creation becomes far too slow, and people leave. This has the consequence that the population ages more rapidly, and that a return to economic growth is even slower. So more people enter despair and leave, and so on. Well, now for the abstract, and note the last paragraph:

Finally it will be argued that the directional and value component which is implicit in the current migration flows is quite simply unsustainable. Unless the Baltic States address the underlying issues of low fertility in the context of rapid ageing and to some extent reverse the ‘brain flight’ which has been so far associated with this, then absence of a sufficient supply of adequately qualified labour will in the space of a decade or so lead to a significant slowdown in the steady sectoral transition in economic activity and place a break on employment expansion in such a way that the economic growth process will either stagnate or even enter decline.

Continue reading

A Word Of Thanks To The IMF

That was the week that was, it’s over, let it go…….

Well I don’t suppose it’s that often that people get the opportunity to enthuse about the International Monetary Fund. Normally you find people like Joseph Stiglitz, or Naomi Klein, who are bitterly critical (often for many of the wrong reasons, here, and here). But I would like to express my gratitude to the Media Relations department of the Fund (and in particular to Mr Murphy – I think I have the name right), for enabling Landon Thomas to have access to the members of the Spanish team to talk about my role, which hasn’t been, let’s be clear, that earth shattering – don’t believe everything you read in the press: it is certainly ridiculous to suggest, for example, that I actually wrote the last report. All I have done is provide some analysis, for consideration, on the evolution of the current account deficit, some opinions over the actual levels of bad debt in the banking system, and some data on off-balance sheet public sector debt.

Anyway, it can’t be that easy for a major multilateral organisation to handle a sensationalized “IMF turns to blogger for advice on Spain” type story sweeping the globe. So I am grateful for the mature and intelligent way they handled a tricky situation which landed in their intray.

Of course, let’s be clear, offering advice does not mean 100% agreement. Evidently the Fund do not (at this point anyway) share the opinions of people like myself and Paul Krugman that growth will only be restored on Europe’s periphery by a series of substantial internal devaluations. They have confidence that a combination of fiscal restraint and long term structural reforms should be sufficient to do the trick. And they surely would in no way contemplate my “plan B” option, which is that if wage and price competitiveness is only returned slowly, then the only realistic way to “unblock” the situation may be to encourage Germany to temporarily return the Deutsche-mark.

In fact, my differences with the Fund over this sort of issue have been on record for some time now, as in the case of the amicable but clear debate I had with IMF Regional Representative for Central Europe and the Baltics Christoph Rosenberg about the desirability, or otherwise, of Latvian devaluation at the time when the IMF programme was initiated there (see my original argument here, Christoph’s reply here, and my response to Christoph here). Or again, take the Hungarian situation, where I have been arguing there will be no solution to the problems that country faces without biting the bullet of converting the Swiss Franc loans to forint. Back in January I warned that the way the programme was being applied was leading to a build up in fiscal liabilities which the incoming government would need to face up to (Hungary Isn’t Another Greece…. Now Is It?), and on this occasion the ongoing IMF Programme was defended by the then Finance Minister, Peter Oszko.

And, coming right up to date, it is hard to be in agreement with the assessment of the stresses the Spanish banking system is under which is made by former Bank of Spain deputy governor José Viñals and his team in their recent Global Financial Stability Report. My view – which I communicated to the Spanish team – is that their evaluation substantially underestimates the likely extent and duration of the Non Performing Loan problem in the Spanish financial system.

Yet despite these ongoing differences, I still favour IMF interventions here in Europe, as in the Greek case, where I was arguing in favour of what eventually became the adopted solution from the begining of January. I think IMF involvement in resolving the problems facing many peripheral Eurozone economies is desireable given the Fund’s accumulated expertise, and relative political distance. On the other hand, it is unrealistic to expect the Fund to take a radically different policy stance from the one determined in Brussels, whose attitudes and opinions must always condition IMF involvement in Europe. So if policy changes are needed, then it is in Brussels and not Washington that these must be initiated.

And nowhere are the insights the Fund can offer going to be more important and useful than here in Spain, where, if the recent leaks to the Financial Times Deutschland are accurate, a call for intervention may not be that far off. Certainly everyone who I have talked to recently is very nervous about the severity of the financing problems currently facing the public and private sector. This week’s decision by the ECB to extend the short term financing operations for another three months, and to continue the programme of buying government bonds will buy time, but that is all. Strategic decisions have now to be taken, the Spanish economy may well be on the point of slipping back into recession in the second half of the year, and the two steps forward, one step back pace of the reforms being implemented by the current administration is painfully slow. So let’s here it for them then, what about a round of applause for all those boys and gals over in Washington who tirelessly labour, day in and day out, in their constant effort to keep Europe’s troubled economies from going “belly up”.

And now, as far as I am concerned, it’s high time life got back to normal.

The Price Of Power

Hell, it seems, knows no fury like the financial markets being told you are about to become the next Greece. The poor Vice President of the election-winning Fidesz party, Lajos Kosa, had no idea what was in store for him when he calmly announced to a group of astonished journalists that Hungary was in the throes of a sovereign debt crisis not disimilar from the one Greece has been passing through. The value of the forint immediately fell sharply, and a whole army of government spokesmen – lead by incumbent Prime Minister Viktor Orban – had to rush for the microphone to try to clarify that the man didn’t mean what he had just said. Continue reading