Thanks for the tip, will bear it in mind.

Doug M (exploiting my new knowledge), The EU is not going to say dammit, these people can’t govern themselves, we’re turning the clock back to 1908 for the next generation. Of course the EU (and US, and all the rest) did say more or less this when they gave the High Representative the Bonn powers in 1998. This is a policy with a natural sell-by date, because the international community doesn’t like paying for protectorates once sullen peace has replaced renewed war as the most likely alternative.

Dougs both,

One of the blind alleys the international community went down in post-war BiH was to buy the liberal Sarajevo consensus that the answer was to get the nationalists our of power, put the multi-ethnic opposition in power, and then let them get on with it. Quite apart from the fact that the electoral base of the opposition was basically limited to the greater Sarajevo and Tuzla areas, this was blown apart when the supposed non-nationalists got into power in 2001; they screwed up in government and lost the 2002 elections, a preliminary version of the wash-and-rinse cycle.

Ashdown’s agenda since then has included two key desiderata: i) depoliticising the means of state coercion (military and police) so that future nationalist governments will find it much more difficult to use them to do evil, and ii) constraining the political paths available to the nationalist governing parties to be in line with Euro-Atlantic integration. The future of BiH does not depend on eradicating nationalist parties (which is not possible) but on taming them.

Actually, I’m on the record here at AFOE as expecting Bosnians (and Herzegovinans, presumably) to vote for their first MEPs in 2014, so the time frame that Doug M. talks about above isn’t too far from my expectations.

Patience is something Brussels has in abundance. It’s results that are sometimes the problem…

Let’s review the bidding:

1) Constitutional reform is “indispensable”.

2) Constitutional reform must transfer responsibilities (and, presumably, /power/… is there a formal rule that this word can’t be used in this sort of discussion, or is it just a very strong convention?) from the entities to BiH.

3) Constitutional reform cannot be imposed.

Now. Given the current composition of the legislative and executive branches of the BiH entities, voluntary constitutional reform giving power to the center seems about as likely as, hm, me flying to the Moon by putting my head between my legs and spitting /really hard/.

It’s of course possible that the good people of BiH may change their minds and elect… well, they’re not going to elect a bunch of non-nationalist technocrats. But maybe they’ll elect some folks who are a bit less interested in jingoistic posturing and a bit more in getting stuff done? Maybe they’ll get tired of the current bunch of dickheads, and willing to try something new?

Perhaps. But based on the experience of BiH’s neighbors, it’s going to require at least one full electoral wash-and-rinse cycle, and probably more, before this even begins to happen. And then maybe it, well, won’t.

I have to say, visiting the two communities does not fill one with hope. They’re teaching their kids different histories, they’re clinging to the old out of fear, and their leaders are still playing the same old tunes over and over and over. It’s easy to see why they’re re-electing the dickheads. What’s harder to see is when and why they’ll stop doing so.

All that said, I do give the Venice folks kudos for spotting the thread that (maybe) dangles out of the knot: the High Rep. Nothing’s going to happen as long as there’s a proconsul who’s really running things, leaving the elected representatives free to shriek and throw feces. The current arrangement is neither fish nor fowl, and being half a colony is worse than either being colonized or being free. The EU is not going to say dammit, these people can’t govern themselves, we’re turning the clock back to 1908 for the next generation. (Though, in practice, it did come pretty close.) So it has to try the other option and give them back real power — oh no! the p-word again! — including the power to screw up bigtime.

Given the speed at which these wheels turn, we’re looking at 1-2 years before that can happen, followed by, mm, another 4-5 years before the BiHers may put some non-dickhead representatives in place… the aforementioned electoral wash cycle. So we’re probably looking at 2010, more likely 2012 or so before serious constitutional reform is really on the table. Does Brussels have that sort of patience? You tell us.

Alternatives: we can elide point #1 and accept some cosmetic changes that won’t really make a difference in terms of giving power back to the center. I think this is unlikely, but given the various byes granted to some recent EU candidates and (cough) members, I don’t think it can quite be ruled out.

Or, we can elide point #3 and jam it down their throats. Presented as some combination of carrots and sticks and such, but netting out to an offer that really, really can’t be refused. I’m not saying good or bad here. I’m just saying that’s on the menu, and will certainly be considered after the first round of blandishments fail to produce any constructive response from Mujo and Haso.

Oh, and then there’s the nuclear option: give up on BiH altogether, pull a Congress of Berlin II: The Sequel!, and go for some sort of general regional rewrite of boundaries, powers and obligations. But that’s pretty wildly unlikely, so never mind.

Anyway. Another good post, and it is nice to see that Brussels is at least considering possibilities other than more of the same.

cheers,

Doug M.