Hardly nonsense. That is exactly what happned. Indeed this was the position of many in the Clinton administration including many the hawks on later military intervention against Serbia. Clark and Holbrooke have taken this poisiton as well.

The war was certainly WIDELY predicted to occur (Milosevoc or not) should Yugolsavia parts be recognized as countries under Tito’s borders with no serious gaurantees.

Fact is the Balkan wars over the past centruy and a quarter are not about ethnic hatred, they are about great powers interests. That is no tin foil conspioracy theory but something acknowledged fully the non-Balkan Balkan historians.

Even if it was inevitable, there remains the 250,000 corpse question - was it inevitable that it would be accomplished by war?

I guess you are not read up much on the Balkans or the wars in question. Or you are intentionally doubling or tripling actual numbers.

About 400,000 Serbs were massacred by the Albanian, Bosnian and Croatian forces that sided with the Nazis in World War Two. Somewhere between 100,000 to 120,000 Bosnians, Serbs, Croatians and Albanians died in the 1990’s iteration of the Balkan wars. The Serbs did most of the killing this time, but they were hardly alone in either targets or methods.

Doug, you said: (It’s traditional in the region, after signing a treaty, to see if you can push just a little further on the battlefield. Failure to grasp this was one of the biggest flaws of Western diplomacy in Yugoslavia.)

In the region? you meant, “everywhere.”

To save Yugoslavia? Impossible by 1989.

To make the breakup much less bloody? Oh my goodness. That could have been done at any time.

As late as spring 1992, it would probably have been possible to make the Lisbon Agreement stick. It would have required a high degree of diplomatic coordination, both within Europe and between the EU and the US; it would also have required a convincing show of force, probably by NATO, when shooting inevitably started. (It’s traditional in the region, after signing a treaty, to see if you can push just a little further on the battlefield. Failure to grasp this was one of the biggest flaws of Western diplomacy in Yugoslavia.)

But it was totally possible. The Bosnian war could have been a wet firecracker.

There’d still be Kosovo, of course, and the Republic of Serb Krajina… but the total casualties could have been reduced by many tens of thousands.

All that was lacking was the will.

Doug M.

Yes, the Bush administration was slow to respond. Chicken Kiev, exactly right. And just as they were finally getting their act together, they got replaced by the Clintons, who spent the next couple of years reinventing the wheel.

Other hand: in defense of Bush, Chicken Kiev looks a lot wiser in retrospect than it did in 1990. Bush seems to have realized that the West didn’t have to do anything in order for Eastern Europe to fall out of the Soviet orbit. All that was needed was to be patient and play it cool. Which were among Bush I’s particular strengths. So, wrong on Yugoslavia, but right on the rest of the former Warsaw Pact and fUSSR.

Alex, nitpick: estimates of the death toll in the Yugoslav wars have been gradually creeping downwards. They’re currently in the 110,000 - 150,000 range.

But otherwise I completely agree. Yugoslavia was doomed by the late ’80s, but the breakup did not have to be nearly as protracted and violent. I think a mostly-peaceful breakup was at least possible. A breakup-with-war was IMO more likely, but even then, the war could have been much shorter and less bloody.

Oh, and John Laughland is indeed a prat. British Helsinki Human Rights Group, my ass.

Doug M.

Yeah, perhaps the breakup was inevitable. But if you crash a car into a bus queue and kill a dozen people, don’t expect to get off on the grounds that the car was too powerful. If the Yugoslav constitutional structure was shaky, that is no defence for jumping up and down on it until it collapsed.

Even if it was inevitable, there remains the 250,000 corpse question - was it inevitable that it would be accomplished by war?

I suspect that in the end, Yugoslavia went away for the same fundamental reason that Weimar did: too few people with real power truly supported it.

Now the sources of that power and the reasons for leaders’ indifference to (or hostility to) Yugoslavia are interesting and subtle questions. But when push came to shove, almost no one was willing to go to the mat for Yugoslavia. And thus the Balkans were even more Balkanized.

Our differences sharpen: I think that’s just totally wrong. To put my cards on the table, I think the breakup was very likely after about 1986, and inevitable by late 1989.

Would this deal have somehow caused Croat nationalism to disappear, and Tudjman to go back to retirement? Would it have silenced both sorts of Kosovars?

– BG, are you familiar with the recent history of Croat nationalism? It’s every bit as virulent as the Serb sort. Not quite as well armed… but this was little comfort to Croatia’s large Serbian minority.

To shut down the feedback loop, you need to somehow shut down both the major parties. Quieting just one isn’t enough. Remember, the “Revolt of the Logs” was a local thing, even if Belgrade promptly seized on it. In your makes-a-deal world, it would still happen. With similar tit-for-tat effects.

I really don’t think the history supports your position. I’d be interested to see you play it out, though.

Doug M.

Interesting. So now it’s a three way split :). I look forward. My difficulty with the arguments which focus principally on leaders is that they miss the large part of the iceberg submerged below the water. I think there are much more complex identity related processes at work here, and as Amin Maalouf says, there are ‘identities’ that kill.

Also there were historic reasons why Europe couldn’t send troops at the start of the war. You could think about Germany but the other major European players have also issues. Besides the ceasefire didn’t happen because of the sending of European troops but the shipment of weapons to the weaker party