There’s still some low-level violence, but not as much as there’s been in the past. Also, acquiring Serb property is probably not a major motive… most of the nicest properties (apartments, shops, farms) were taken in 1999-2000. Also, it’s much harder to just grab property now; if a Serb family leaves, they can sell it to the highest bidder. That’s changed from a few years ago, when a local Albanian clan might simply take over.

Also, don’t neglect the economic aspect. The Albanians could treat the Serbs south of the Ibar with perfect respect, and the Serbs would still be leaving. Albanians are leaving Kosovo in droves, after all.

Doug M.

According to opinion polls by Kosovo’s government 30% of the Serbs will leave if Kosovo becomes independent. That will probably involve the majority of those south of the Ibar.

The Ahtisaari plan doesn’t hardly mention any security improvements for Kosovo’s Serbs: it talks only about autonomy. So the pressure on Kosovo’s Serbs to leave will stay and the tension will stay. Many more will leave - making the autonomy hollow.

No Serb leader can afford to accept such ethnic cleansing on territory what according to international law still is theirs.

My estimate: for many decades to come we will have a heightened risk for war in the Balkan. And that all because our diplomats couldn’t think up anything better than that partial Ahtisaari plan.

But I would be surprised to see many countries jumping on the bandwagon to recognize whatever territorial claim a self-declared government in Pristina might make, especially if it includes territory that government does not de facto control. And if the government in Pristina pushes the issue, is not satisfied with being a Taiwan, I can see Kosovo becoming a Balkan Kashmir, a far less happy situation.

If the choreography of status finalization in the next few months is executed deftly, we might be able to see the conflict start to thaw. But I’m not as confident as Doug that the hardliners on the Albanian side will exercise the restraint that’s needed for that to happen.

I wonder about the violence question in general. I was shocked by the visceral hatred and the overt violence that permeated society in Kosovo immediately after the war. Certainly this was partly due to the brutalisation of an already awkward society, but I now think it was also because the victors really weren’t convinced that they’d won. With independence, they will be convinced - and possibly feel that they don’t have anything to prove any more.

Or possibly not.

I think violence against the Serbs in the south is less likely, though. Not impossible, certainly, but not the way to bet. They’re a small minority now, and the Albanians are aware that they’re under scrutiny.

Doug M.

On the other hand, the “no” list would include Russia, China, Romania, Greece and (of course!) Serbia. Also, a lot of non-European countries with minority issues — Indonesia — or who just aren’t comfortable seeing a UN resolution ignored.

Doug M.

The expulsion of Kosovo Serbs from the enclaves–whether by violence or by the creation of a political climate less compromising than the Ahtisaari-focused rhetoric from Pristina today–would be a boon to Belgrade, enabling Serbia to portray Kosovo’s quasi-state as inimical to minority rights. If things blow up in Mitrovica, that becomes a much more likely endgame.

I agree Russia will do very little. The only question is quite how crazy the Serbian government is willing to be - in general, the crazier they are, the more sympathy Kosovo will get and the worse it will be for them.