Croatia can alwasy proclaim that Euro-Atlantic integrations, financial incentives, international co-operation etc. is simply not worth losing “national dignity”. Croatian politicians can always pull the plug on the whole EU/NATO process. In couple of years Croatia will become pariah with living standards of North Korea, but, at least theoretically, it will remain an independent state, and, last but not least, the regime responsible for that policy shift can expect at least couple of years before international community or domestic opposition gets its act together and make serious effort of changing it.

Kosovo, for all the reasons, mentioned by other commentators, can’t use this option.

The EU (and the international community as a whole) isn’t anywhere near reaching a consensus view on Kosovo independence. EU foreign ministers stated last month that a return to the pre-1999 situation is not on the cards, but that still leaves a very large range of options.

So nobody is in the position of being able to make a credible and immediate promise of alliance with the Kosovo Albanians to deliver independence, let alone of threatening to withhold it if they misbehave.

BG

I think the Hague’s lack of concern for the consequences of how it handles the cases stems from ICTY’s concept of itself as truly independent; but I suspect that a different approach on their part could have made “independent” seem less of a synonym for “unhelpful”.

I hear that the evidence against Haradinaj has been mostly submitted by the Serbs, in which case a lot of it may well fall apart anyway (some has already been disproved, murder victims still being alive, etc). NATO folks had very little on him.

Totally agreed on Romania - have you seen Tom Gallagher’s new book? - but I think the Bucharest chickens are coming to roost in Zagreb. If in no other way, Croatia’s application is linked to Turkey’s in that the EU has a new tougher policy.

BG.

Great post, and I also agree with you WRT Kosovo and Haradinaj. I do have a couple of quibbles, though.

1) I don’t think del Ponte bears blame for the killing of Djindjic. The key factor there was that, after two years of compromise and failed appeasement, Djindjic was showing some willingness to move against the Red Berets and the whole foul nodulus of corruption, crime and violence swirling around them. They turned on Djindjic because it looked like he was getting ready to start clipping their wings, not because of del Ponte or the Hague

However, this doesn’t let del Ponte off the hook. Her botching of the Milosevic trial at a tactical level made it harder for Djindjic to cooperate with the Hague, and has given aid and comfort to bad actors in the region for a while now.

2) It’s going to be bitchin’ hard to convict Haradinaj (which is why I was mildly surprised that they indicted him). Albanians are clannish and close-mouthed even by Balkan standards, the Kosovo guerilla movements didn’t leave much of a paper trail, and a certain amount of useful information is locked firmly in the archives of the military and security agencies of various NATO powers. So he could go off to the Hague with a rather high degree of confidence IMO.

As to Croatia: FWIW, I’m rooting for the EU to take a firm line. The region needs it, and it will set a valuable precedent when it’s time to talk accession with Serbia, Albania, Bosnia, and even Turkey. I live in Romania, BTW, and I think the EU has been absurdly lenient on accession negotiations here. The pattern that’s emerging so far is that Brussels will huff and puff, but in the end will always roll over rather than upset the prearranged schedule. That’s a paradigm that really needs to be broken.

cheers,

Doug M.

Croatia and Serbia have every incentive to comply with the war crimes tribunal due to the demands of Euro-Atlantic integration, just as Kosovo does due to its somewhat different situation; but it doesn’t work unless the leaders at the very top make the decision to go in that direction. On that basis Pristina is ahead of Zagreb and Belgrade at the moment.