Comments on: Some stupid stuff about Ukraine

By: wolff

wolff — Wed, 05 Aug 2009 17:14:01 +0000

As for the merit of the blog entry, Wagner certainly treats the matter with a rush judgment, sometimes with condescension and says stupid things. For example the notion that some people can play away their right for something due to the act of their forbears. But – mainly, but not exclusively – from a point of view of someone who, maybe with naivete, took the discourse of the transition and enlargement at face value he makes some valid points. As the transition was marked by such ideas as democracy, European values etc. (the accession criteria was interpreted and treated that way as well) it is legitimate to ask whether those already prevailed in Ukraine or not. (And after the half-success of the real enlargement it is not the worst idea. Before somebody would attack me, as enjoying the advantages of the enlargement and denying it from others, I have serious doubts whether it was a good idea to let Hungary in the way it happened.) On the other hand Ukraine is really a divided country and moreover it is facing a demographic disaster, effectively making it a failed state in the mid-term.

Everyone taking enlargement with Ukraine seriously have to address these problems. Personally I’m in favor of any enlargement in Europe, but only if a, Europe is transformed into a federation, the only way to address the problems of ECE and b, if that way every candidate country has to adhere strictly to the preconditions set by the fact, that Europe is a federation. And even if it won’t be one in the nearest future, the latter should be applied. Clear preconditions and their application in their entirety. (Or the EU can seriously be reconsidered. My point is not about absorbtion capacity and such things, but on the problem if the EU’s identity – in a broad sense – is that of a loose one or a more coherent.)

By: wolff

wolff — Wed, 05 Aug 2009 16:49:40 +0000

It is regrettable to find such an interesting discussion so much time after it expired. Anyway I would like to correct some assumptions of Ms. Cernahoschi, regarding Banat-Swabians and Saxons from Transylvania. First of all, the Saxons never had any independent entity, neither in a feudal sense, and especially not according to a post-Westphalian framework. They had a large autonomy – inherited from the middle ages and extended in the period of a Transylvanian Principality, a fief of the Ottoman Empire – and abolished in 1848, reinstalled in 1860/61 and once gain abolished in 1876. But during the 18th and early 19th centuries, as a way to preserve this situation, a significant part – maybe a majority – of their elite and intelligentsia increasingly relied on the Habsburg dynasty as a guardian of their particular situation. It was altered after the compromise in 1867, but the dynasty remained a reference point, especially as Hungary’s political scene was seen as always posing the danger of overturning the system of the compromise and let loose the forces of Hungarian nationalism without any restraint. But paralelly they became aware of the German option as well, a part of their politicians opting for the latter, another part trying to make a balance, even a compromise with Hungarian political forces keen on keeping the Monarchy intact.

Ironically, the WWI lead to the strengthening of the German and the Hungarian option simultaneously and for everyone. The uprooted Saxons, running away an invading Romanian army were received warmly in Hungary proper while the Romanians were driven back by German troops and even Wilhelm II paid a visit to the region in 1917. Anyway, the decision of the famous Medias/Mediasch assembly in January 1919, embracing the Romanian sovereignty over Transylvania, was not the result of some hate of the Empire – ceased to exist for any not so dumb observers of the events as early as November –, but rationalistic calculation.

But even the Swabians were not so focused on the empire, especially among their urban middle class a pro-Hungarian stance was prevalent. Moreover, the awakening of their German-ness was not the least a result of the activity of some German oriented Saxons. But the difference between Banat-Swabians and Saxons certainly existed, even in their self-awareness, due to differences in religion, culture, social system, although the process of Gleichschaltung was an important source of unification.

By: Raluca Cernahoschi

Raluca Cernahoschi — Sun, 15 Feb 2009 04:05:29 +0000

Great discussion and deserved critique of Wagner’s regrettable views on Ukraine. He happens to be a good writer, and it is always a bit shocking to find out that someone who has seen and written penetratively about the situation of the Romanians and Romanian-Germans can be so narrow-minded about a neighbouring population. (It’s probably what shocked Pollack, too.) In the interest of keeping the discussion on the level, though, and because much of it is about geography, I feel compelled to make the following correction: Richard Wagner is not from Transylvania, but from the Banat, a region with a completely different history and culture from the former. Although the Germans of both regions are now known as Romanian-Germans, the Transylvanian Saxons and Banat Swabians have very different traditions and self-identities. The Transylvanian Saxons, for instance, didn’t care much for the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which robbed them of a former independent status, while the Banat Swabians were deeply attached to the Empire. The Empire is often proposed as a model of multiculturality, a kind of proto-EU, a desirable manifestation for ex-Austro-Hungarian populations now on the margins of the EU.

By: Daniel Antal

Daniel Antal — Tue, 05 Aug 2008 14:21:18 +0000

Peter, I think you are right that many people would claim that admitting Ukraine would make the accession of Turkey more difficult. There are very different interest at stake. I don’t think that is the real issue here, but I think there will be people who will make an either/or case and a bad compromise may be the neither/nor.

By: Ron Hulscher

Ron Hulscher — Sat, 02 Aug 2008 06:18:19 +0000

I noticed the use of the word Byzantium has been used several times in this article. Although the word Byzantium is commonly used, personally I don’t like the use of Byzantium because it is an artificial concept. It came out of the fantasy of historians, long after the fall of Constantinople. Although the political and historical reasons for which historians have created this concept, have long ago loosed their valid, it remained for them a fixed idea.
When I should ask an historian: “what empire cease to exist with the capture of Constantinople in 1453 by caliph Mehmed 2?”, he would probably answer me that it was the existence of Byzantium what was ended by this event. But than I would say to him that that was not possible, because in 1453 it still has to take many years before the fantasy of the historians would have created Byzantium. So, if Byzantium was not created in 1453, what empire did ended then? When we were able to ask the same question to a defender who survived the siege of Constantinople, he should have given us the right answer: it was the (eastern) roman empire. And I doubt if there is a historian to be found who is able to convince that defender, that the name of his native country was actually Byzantium.
Ron.

By: Peter

Peter — Sat, 02 Aug 2008 02:24:22 +0000

Would admitting Ukraine make it more difficult for the EU to keep excluding Turkey? Perhaps that’s the real issue.

By: Jussi Jalonen

Jussi Jalonen — Fri, 01 Aug 2008 14:22:41 +0000

I like Wagner’s screed because it manages to be splendidly incoherent and inconsistent on so many levels at once.

Galicia was never part of Ukraine, and all the local luminaries were Jews, Poles or Germans, and Ukrainians were hardly ever a significant part of the local population, but even if they were, it doesn’t matter, because the whole region was just a half-Asiatic non-European backwater, and the Ukrainians were not among the upper class, but even though there were hardly any Ukrainians in Galicia or at least they didn’t identify themselves as Ukrainians and had no prominence whatsoever, they _still_ were a “political and cultural elite” and had enough clout to destroy the whole Habsburg Empire and because of this cardinal sin, they should be refused access to the European Union.

I mean, huh? I know a nice lady from the University of Ivan Franko. Perhaps I should forward the article to her, so she could have a good laugh.

Anyway. Wagner doesn’t seem to know much of anything of the history of the region, but the part about how the Galician Ukrainians share the responsibility for the destruction of the Habsburg Empire is particularly hilarious. The traditional Galician loyalism and the story of the Ukrainian Sharp-Shooters in the Imperial and Royal Army seems to be unknown to him. Not to mention the story of those Ukrainians who were thrown to concentration camps in 1914-1915 by the Russian and Austrian military authorities, respectively.

Still, perhaps blocking the EU membership from all those countries that participated in the destruction of the Habsburg Empire really is a pretty good idea. Let’s throw out all those Entente countries who sent troops to the Isonzo and Saloniki fronts. Especially France, since Clemenceau played an important part in the final decision to put Austria-Hungary completely out of its misery.

But who the hell named Austria-Hungary as the precursor to the European Union, and where’s Wagner getting this from? I could just as well regard the League of Nations as the direct predecessor of the EU, and state that “we should not forget all those peoples who were instrumental in bringing down the League; not least the Germans and the Italians”.

As expected, Wagner also manages to throw in the usual stuff of how the West Ukrainians were all goddamn Nazi collaborators. Never mind that this is a slur that one usually hears from “Homo Sovieticus”-types who don’t really share the “occidental” views on the world.

(Ukrainians were Nazi collaborators? As opposed to Balkan Germans? Okay.)

Cheers,

J. J.

By: Alex (not the other one)

Alex (not the other one) — Fri, 01 Aug 2008 11:17:46 +0000

Further, what the hell is a Byzantine habitus anyway? Strange, it looks a lot like this bag of unexamined assumptions I happened to have lying around.

Also, there was a very good reason why the 1950s EU was “dedicated to the Occidental idea”; the other bit was occupied by the Russians.

Regarding German Russophilia, this goes right back to Bahr/Gromyko; the theory is something like this. There is no conflict between Ostpolitik and NATO/EU membership – this membership (Westintegration) is the guarantee that permits us to deal with the East Germans and Russians. This is however dependent on inter-superpower calm (no Grosswetterlage as Honecker put it), and therefore it is a primary German interest to make nice with the Russians.

Obviously this got revised with reunification; in a sense, East Germany was swapped for the ex-Warsaw Pact states. Their integration in NATO and the EU was dependent on Russian acquiescence; therefore Germany must be nice to the Russians.

By: Alex

Alex — Thu, 31 Jul 2008 21:28:48 +0000

Re Germans being Russophiles: Kissinger predicted that in his book “Does America need a foreign policy?” (which I mentally subtitle “Remedial foreign policy for backward presidents”). His argument was something like, that under Bismarck Germany successfully kept diplomatic options open with both Russia and the Western powers, and since then whenever Germany has lost its ‘Russian option’ things have gone badly for them, so many Germans instinctively fear throwing themselves entirely in with the EU.

I don’t know enough history to evaluate his thesis.

By: Stefan

Stefan — Thu, 31 Jul 2008 19:15:52 +0000

Last time I looked Norway wasn’t part of the EU, but of the Schengen zone…