In a recent post I noted that, despite some improvements, good corporate governance isn’t something Germans have an easy time getting their heads round. The Financial Times Deutschland reports that there might be a good reason for this: in Germany, it doesn’t seem to matter much how well a corporation is governed.
As the FTD reports, a new study from the consultancy Ergo Kommunikation maintains that ‘investors do not reward German firms that abide by the Corporate Government Code…. Their share prices profit just as little from a high level of transparency or disclosure of managing directors’ compensation.’ [My translation.]
About the bombings in London I have nothing useful to say, beyond expressing my sympathies for the wounded and bereaved and my admiration of Londoners’ stoic resolve. And as others, here and elsewhere, are expressing those things better than I could, I shall leave it to them to do so.
Instead I shall turn to another topic, one that is admittedly less dramatic, but important for all that. That topic is corporate governance; specifically, corporate governance as it is (or is not) implemented in Germany. In recent days German headlines have been full of two particularly interesting items: a corporate governance scandal of colossal proportions at a major firm, and now a significant governance reform that is unlikely to make top German managers very happy.
It seems we’re not the only ones who are beginning to see governance model incongruencies behind some of the German economic ills (see two of my last posts (1, 2), and, especially the comments to the last one).
Over at Crooked Timber, Henry Farrell (who knows Germany well, having beeen a research fellow at the The Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods) gets a bit angry at the Economist for their usually biased coverage of Continental European social and economic models, before declaring his support for Franz M?ntefering.