Stark Raving Mad?

Not necessarily, but he is causing one hell of a fuss today. The Stark in question here is, of course, ECB Executive Board member Juergen Stark, who stated in an interview with the Italian Newspaper Il Sole 24 Ore that, in his opionion, the European Union would not help bail out Greece if the need were to arise. Certainly the initial reports of his statements sent shock waves round the globe. The euro dropped as much as 0.5 percent to $1.4282 after the remarks before laterrecouping its losses, and the yield on Greece’s 10-year government bond rose 4 basis points to 5.672 percent. Essentially it is hardly surprising that this should be the case, since following what happened in Dubai, two questions seem to have been in the forefront of investors’ minds: i) who is going to pay for all that surplus second residence property that has been built all along Europe’s periphery (from Ireland, to the Baltics, to Hungary, to Bulgaria, to Greece, to Sovenia, to Spain, and to Portugal); and ii) are the core European states really going to prop up the peripheral ones (in extremis) or will they follow the example of Abu Dhabi, and pick and chose what they will support and what they won’t. More than anything else it is uncertainty on these two points which lies behind all the earth tremors currently shaking the monetary union.

In the interests of clarity, and before commenting further, I am reproducing the relevant extract in its entirely below, first in Italian, and then as a rough and ready English translation.

Il Sole 24 Ore: Il caso Grecia continua a tenere banco, nonostante le assicurazioni di Atene su una rapida riduzione del deficit. Non crede che un salvataggio debba considerarsi necessario o forse anche inevitabile?

Juergen Stark: La Grecia è in una situazione molto difficile: non solo il deficit è a livelli molto elevati, ma il paese ha anche sofferto una grave perdita di competitività. Questi problemi non sono legati alla crisi globale, ma sono stati creati in casa. E devono essere affrontati con le dovute misure economiche nell’interesse dei cittadini greci e nel rispetto delle responsabilità che il governo ha nei confronti della moneta unica e dei paesi partner. Le regole, ribadite in una dichiarazione dell’Ecofin a Cardiff nel 1998, sono chiare: la partecipazione all’Unione monetaria non consente alcun diritto a rivendicare sostegno finanziario da parte di uno Stato membro.

Il Sole 24 Ore: Ma appartenere all’Unione monetaria non significa anche solidarietà, oltre che responsabilità? Gli stessi Trattati permettono «un’assistenza finanziaria» nel caso di «gravi difficoltà» e in «circostanze eccezionali».

Juergen Stark: È vero, ma i Trattati dicono anche che queste circostanze devono «sfuggire al controllo» del paese in questione. Non è il nostro caso. Come ho appena detto, i problemi della Grecia sono prettamente greci, come ha ammesso lo stesso premier George Papandreou. In questi anni, il paese non ha tenuto sotto controllo i conti pubblici, né ha lavorato per migliorare la competitività. I Trattati prevedono la clausola di non salvataggio e le regole vanno rispettate. È un aspetto cruciale per garantire il futuro di un’Unione monetaria tra paesi sovrani con bilanci nazionali. I mercati si illudono quando pensano che a un certo punto gli altri Stati membri metteranno mano al portafoglio per salvare la Grecia.

Il Sole 24 Ore: The Greece situation continues to be a focus of attention, despite assurances from Athens on a rapid reduction in the deficit. Do you not believe that a rescue might be considered necessary or perhaps even inevitable?

Juergen Stark: Greece is a very difficult situation: not only is the deficit very high, but the country has also suffered a serious loss of competitiveness. These problems are not related to the global crisis, but were created in-house. And they must be addressed with appropriate economic measures in the interests of both Greek citizens, and with respect to the responsibilities that the Greek government has with both the euro and its EU partners. The rules, as set out in an Econfin statement in Cardiff in 1998, are clear: the monetary union does not allow any right of any Member State to claim financial support.

Il Sole 24 Ore: But doesn’t belonging to a monetary union also imply solidarity, as well as responsibility? The very same treaties allow “financial assistance” in case of ‘serious difficulties’ and ‘exceptional circumstances’.

Juergen Stark: True, but the treaties also say that these circumstancesmust be “out of control” of the country in question. Is not the present case. As I just said, the problems in Greece are purely Greek, as was admitted by the Prime Minister George Papandreou. In recent years, the country has not kept public accounts under control, nor has it worked to improve competitiveness. The treaties provide for a “no bail out clause” and these rules must be respected. This is crucial to ensure the future of a monetary union between sovereign countries with separate national budgets. The markets are deluded if they think that at some point the other States will put their hand in their wallets to save Greece

Well, a lot of points arise here. In the first place the ECB simply is not the competent authority to take decisions on whether or not to bail out a country. Decisions of this order would need to be taken by the EU Council (which essentially means the collectivity of individual States) and would involve financial intermediation in which the ECB may or may not participate. Secondly, Juergen Stark is an elected politician, and his view do NOT necessarily represent those of the present German government

As Laurent Bilke, economist with Nomura International says:

“ECB officials tend to consider themselves as the guardian of the temple of fiscal discipline, but Juergen Stark pushed maybe the argument a bit far this time. The ECB is just not in the business of bailing out countries. It is not competent to dispose (or not) of EU states, European Commission or IMF funds. Juergen Stark also sounded more alarmist than his fellow ECB colleagues have recently and this may not be very opportune in the current context. That is hitting where it hurts. The ECB President, in contrast, stressed that he was confident that the Greek government would do what is required, a more positive message.”

But there is another detail which most of the press corps who jumped on the story seem to have missed, and that is that a bail out is not in question at the present time, and even if it was, EU institutions would find solutions to go round the problem, like a joint Eurobond issuance or some appropriate funding from the European Commission. Further, it is very important to note that Juergen Stark does not rule out common support in a country where the situation had gotten “out of control”. This may, or may not, happen at some point with Greece, the only real reading you can put on Stark’s statement is that we haven’t gotten there yet. He could also be seen as giving a warning shot to the Greek authorities in the current situation – “sort the problems out yourselves”.

Certainly Greek Finance Minister George Papaconstantinou seems to have got that part of the message, since he was very quick to jump in and point out that his government doesn’t need outside help to cut its budget deficit. “Frankly we don’t need that clarification,” Papaconstantinou told Bloomberg Television. “We don’t expect to be bailed out by anybody as, I think, is perfectly clear we’re doing what needs to be done to bring the deficit down and control the public debt.”

But doubts still remain, since while Papaconstantinou talks about correcting the budget deficit, everyone else is talking about deep structural reform and restoring competitiveness, and it isn’t clear that the Greek government is single-handedly able to assume responsibility for this inside the country. As Jonathan Tepper of Variant Perception puts it:

The problems Greece faces are not problems the ECB can solve. Greece’s problems are problems relating to competitiveness, real effective exchange rates, and fiscal budgets. The Greeks must address these structural problems themselves. If they were to seek outside help, the IMF would be the logical organization charged with helping countries in fiscal binds that are making structural adjustments. The ECB simply doesn’t have the power or ability to do that. I’m afraid we’ll likely see more internal civil unrest, as the necessary adjustments for Greece will be painful.

Mark Pittaway, Senior Lecturer in European Studies at the UK Open University goes even further, by adding a CEE dimension:

“If the zone does lock weaker economies into ‘competitive disinflation’ vis-a-vis an export-oriented Germany, why is it in the interests of ‘peripheral countries’ to say in the Eurozone at all? Why is it in the interests of CEE countries to attempt to join in the first place, since if Martin Woolf is right, it would mean Hungary and other states abandoning their long-term goal of having living standards like those in western Europe?”

“Given that political legitimacy in many European states is all about welfare, and ‘European’ legitimacy is about the alleged social superiority of a ‘European model’ over its Anglo-Saxon equivalents (whether this is actually true is irrelevant, the point is that many European believe it to be true), then the potential size of this crisis is quite big. And one thing is clear, that Brussels and others will have to do some fairly serious re-thinking if they want to go forward.”

Basically, personally, I haven’t that much to add at this stage to what I said yesterday, the big difficulty we have right now is making it clear who is authorised to do what, and then doing it.

Basically, what seems to be going on here is a huge poker-style game of brinksmanship, with none of the various parties (the Greek government, the EU Commission, the IMF, and the Credit Ratings Agencies – to name but a few – really absolutely clear about what the others are up to, or what they really want. You could even add-in more “stakeholders” (in terms of parties who will have to assume ownership of any final agreement) if you want, the French and German governments, for example, the EU Finance Ministers, the Greek Socialist Party, the Greek Trade Unions, the list, in fact, is well nigh endless.

This is really far from a desireable state of affairs for a team of people who collectively are going to have to try and solve one of the most complex problems to have emerged from the recent economic and financial crisis, and do it quickly, since there is a clock ticking away in the background. Evidently the Greek government should be having to negotiate with everyone else, but the others should have one common voice, and this is far from being the case, which is what leads to all the confusion, and is why Belka says the EU needs to put a mechanism in place to handle this kind of situation – a uniform mechanism which treats all EU members – whether inside or outside the Eurozone – fairly, and where the rules and procedures are clear to all. This mechanism, should, as I have suggested, include powers for the EU Commission to intervene over the heads of national parliaments (a need which is already evident in the Latvian case), and implement hard and unpopular solutions when they are in the interest of the entire community of Europeans. We cannot have one minority interest after another playing themselves off against the rest, it makes the Union harder to manage than a “hung” parliament.

Actually the FT’s Ralph Atkins turns this amibguity into a virtue:

“Mr Stark’s comments fit with Europe’s policy of “constructive ambiguity” towards Athens – by which policymakers are deliberately being vague about what would actually happen if the worst came to pass. Pressure is thus being maintained on Greece to make good its pledges of fiscal discipline.”

I am not convinced, I think all this ambiguity is more disconcerting than it is constructive, it isn’t like keeping markets guessing before a rate-setting meeting. I think what everyone needs is some assurance that EU authorities are aware of the depth of the problem, have solutions ready, and are hell bent on implementing them. That is the message the financial markets need to hear, and they need to know who is going to be leading this operation.

Finally, I want to emphasise that my argument here shouldn’t be read as saying that I don’t wish the EU was equipped to do the necessary and start to shoulder responsibility for Greece. My view is a more practical one: I simply think the EU is not yet sufficiently prepared to go in and tell Greece what to do, in part because Greece are one of the old EU15 and this makes everything more difficult. I simply think it is more practical to get the IMF go in and do the job. You don’t want “good boys” here, you need “nasty people”, with smoothly polished teeth, and indirectly this could give a weak Greek government the strength it needs to sell the changes to a reluctant citizenry.

It’s like taking a child to the dentist. Maybe they scream when the drill comes out, but ultimately they need the filling. But I also accept that the IMF has no magic bullet. I do however hope that the IMF is capable of learning from its recent experiences in the East.

One of the key issues which clinches it for me is the collateral rating issue. Do the ECB say no Greek bonds after the next downgrade (this certainly will cause some chaos, since half Greek bonds are held out of Greece)? It would be chaos, but it would be manageable. Or should the ECB keep the lower level criteria – then what happens to Italy, since this rule was made for Italy, and never forget, Italy is also slippin-and-a-slidin steadily into the default danger zone?

The thing is, my view is that the problem of not having the ECB take your bonds does become a serious one, since it will make it much more difficult to sell debt, interest rates rise, GDP falls, nominal GDP falls further, and debt to GDP keeps rising, as a result of which interest rates rise further, and eventually there is no alternative to default. On the other hand, if the ECB say don’t worry, we will take the bonds anyway, then there is little incentive to do anything, as we have seen over the last decade.

In essence, were the IMF managing a programme in Greece, then the ECB could make an exception, and then say to Italy – “you want to be an exception, then go to the IMF first, or better, put your house in order before you are forced to do so”.

This entry was posted in A Fistful Of Euros, Economics: Country briefings, Economics: Currencies by Edward Hugh. Bookmark the permalink.

About Edward Hugh

Edward 'the bonobo is a Catalan economist of British extraction. After being born, brought-up and educated in the United Kingdom, Edward subsequently settled in Barcelona where he has now lived for over 15 years. As a consequence Edward considers himself to be "Catalan by adoption". He has also to some extent been "adopted by Catalonia", since throughout the current economic crisis he has been a constant voice on TV, radio and in the press arguing in favor of the need for some kind of internal devaluation if Spain wants to stay inside the Euro. By inclination he is a macro economist, but his obsession with trying to understand the economic impact of demographic changes has often taken him far from home, off and away from the more tranquil and placid pastures of the dismal science, into the bracken and thicket of demography, anthropology, biology, sociology and systems theory. All of which has lead him to ask himself whether Thomas Wolfe was not in fact right when he asserted that the fact of the matter is "you can never go home again".

22 thoughts on “Stark Raving Mad?

  1. As the main cause of all European problems is the long lasting wage dumping in Germany, somehow the reason for a free trade Union begins to extinguish. Until now countries on periphery (which do NOT profit from EU Free trade absolutely and relatively) have accepted the status quo due to ECB and similar arrangements. If these arrangements cease to function in the traditional way, why to support wage dumping driven competitiviness, because a real competitiviness is not more typical for Germany – all the BMWs, Audu, Mercedes must be called back to factories zillions of times to eliminate remaining defects.

  2. govs from Latvia,

    Wage dumping? German wages are among the highest in the world, so where’s the dumping? I don’t get the point.

  3. Considering that Greek 10-years are currently at 4-week lows and (at 3:50 pm Jan. 6) yielding 5.66% – 16 points below last Friday’s close – and the yield spread to the bund is 15 bps tighter than last Friday and also at 4-week tights, the obvious conclusion is that the only fuss Mr. Stark is causing is within the hallowed halls of Fistful of Euros.

    Unbelievably bad journalism.

  4. Read, please

    Please, separate wages in Germany reflected to their internal market from those effective on external markets, and popped with all kinds of export subsidies. And don’t forget that Germany is the 4th most protectionistic country in the World. And there is immanent competitiviness of Germany because of their financial size and access to cheap credit and ECB Board.

    The situation with Germany’s “beggar your neighbour” policy during the present Crisis has produced serious concerns also in Germany itself, read:;2505165;0

    because, for instance, EU peripheral countries are getting less and less able to import German goods. The situation is just not sustainable. For instance, in Latvia the sales of new cars has dropped for 88% during 2009. Baltic countries have now become a large net exporter of new cars because repossessed vehicles are sold back in Germany.

    Who is going to buy all these German and French exports after inventory cycle will end??

  5. My earlier comment

    However, the official Bruxelles voices „Ireland good, Greece bad” are also lacking any real background – why the debt driven implosion in Ireland is better than the debt explosion in Greece? Why there must be any reason that the sinking of the Irish economy into gigantic empty hole left after real estate bubble burst, losing of 200% of national GDP to vacuum NAMA scheme, must be something more advantageous as overexpenditure in Greece? Exactly the opposite is true, because the Greek debt has transformed into submarines, chemicals etc. real goods, whereas the Irish NAMA is a typical Torricelli-named substance. In the worst case scenario Greece can use their submarines to claim the Smyrna back, whereas Ireland can use the NAMA for NOTHING.

  6. The ECB Executive Council’s job is to implement the decisions of the Governing Council. In other words, Stark is a minion who has no final say whatsoever in the matter of policy. Chalk this up as a bit more German rhetoric for domestic consumption.

    Govs from Latvia is barking up the right tree here. The EU country with the big problem here is Germany. Interest rates custom made for the German economy caused alot of Audis and such to be sold in the countries that sported inflation. It is essential that none be allowed to fail financially.

    As a last note, Greek 10-yr CDS tightened today.


  7. Hi Charles,

    “The ECB Executive Council’s job is to implement the decisions of the Governing Council. In other words, Stark is a minion who has no final say whatsoever in the matter of policy.”

    But members of the Executive Council are ex-officio members of the Governing Council. That is, he is one of the 22 people who meet every month to take the decisions the Executive Board implement.

  8. Please Edward,

    His membership in the Governing Council is wholly dependent on his being in the Executive. Had he the higher status of the latter, he would have identified himself as such in the interview. Quite clearly, he does not consider himself to be a decision maker within the ECB – this being confirmed by the Executive Council’s mandate being solely the implementation of decisions made by their superiors.

    Middle management does not dictate company policy, even though they may be present at meetings. The bond and CDS markets know this and interpreted his statement as, at best, irrelevant.

  9. Govs from Latvia

    Ireland’s NAMA = 200% of GDP?

    Eh, no it doesn’t. It’s 54bn in bad assets vs 165bn GDP. As such, it represents about 33% of GDP. Even if you take the ultimate worst case scenario and you roll up funding costs etc and assume the assets are almost worthless, you’d still come in at only around 100bn over a 7 yr period, so 60% of GDP. Even if you then decided to also include any massive recapitalisation process onto this of say 25bn, then you’d still only be at 75% or so, and again over a decade. And this is the ultimate worst case scenario. At no stage can you even remotely get close to “200% of GDP”. Greece meanwhile is awash with submarines and showing no real signs of actually cutting their deficit, if they actually have a handle over just what their deficit really is. It could be 15% for all we know, maybe even higher, and with a much worse demographic picture to contend with over the next quarter of a century. THAT is why Greece’s debt is being hammered left, right and centre in the markets…

  10. Pingback: Stark raving mad? - Viewsflow

  11. Certainly the initial reports of his statements sent shock waves round the globe. The euro dropped as much as 0.5 percent to $1.4282 after the remarks before later recouping its losses, and the yield on Greece’s 10-year government bond rose 4 basis points to 5.672 percent.

    Is this sarcasm or a typo? Because the euro drops or rises 0.5% or more almost every other day. Statistical noise.

  12. In the end, the eurozone worked out as: “Peripheral countries will enjoy the low rates on debt being paid by France and Germany and in turn they can’t devalue in every recession to restore competitiveness.”

    In essence, these countries enjoyed the good times and failed to anticipate the impact of being in the eurozone in a (severe) recession. Then again, they were allowed to join in the first place with a mechanism in place to punish excessive deficits that was never really applied since it was unrealistic from the beginning.

  13. Sorry, but Greece’s problems are almost entirely self-inflicted, and blaming the Germans for it is seriously barking up the wrong tree.

    Greece has for decades suffered from corruption and poor fiscal discipline. In the past, this just led to devaluations in the exchange rate – but now that it’s in the Eurozone, Greece cannot devalue.

    From the late 90s and much of the 00s, Greece enjoyed some of the highest growth rates in Europe – and now, because it failed to get it’s fiscal house in order when the going was good it is paying the price.

    Greece’s problems are self-inflicted. And attempting to place the blame on Germany is preposterous.

  14. Hi Ajay,

    “Is this sarcasm or a typo?”

    No, it’s for real. The 0.5% drop followed immediately in the wake of the news. 0.5% may not be an especially large move in the course of a day, but it is an unusually large move in a matter of minutes on the back of a single interview.

    You may read this as mere noise, I read it as symptomatic of the fact that financial markets are still extremely nervous about this who is responsible for what issue, they have been since Dubai, and they will continue to be till it is clarified.

    I did say “initial reports”, had anyone else come out and backed Stark the situation could – eg – have deteriorated (unlikely), but a whole host of people (including the Greek finance minister) came rushing out to “clarify” the situation (plus a lot of people in central banks could have been pushing buy buttons), and the think calmed down again. But it will all come back, as I say, until the actual situation becomes much, much clearer.

  15. “Secondly, Juergen Stark is an elected politician,”

    Who else on the ECB executive board is elected?

    I don’t see any mention in Herr Stark’s comments that the ECB can’t ride to the rescue. It is peculiar, is it not, that the ECB should be commenting on what the EU can and can’t do, but giving so little information about what the ECB itself can and can’t do?

  16. @ Govs: Greece hasn’t paid for those submarines yet. They still owe Thyssen-Krupp for them.

    @ Charles Butler: Jürgen Stark is important, not because of whatever post he holds at ECB, but simply because he is German, and as such he speaks for the Bundesbank in these matters. There can be no solution to the EU problems without Germany, which means that BUBA plays a key role. I doubt that Mrs. Merkel will dare to act without BUBA’s consent. The last time a German Chancellor did that (Mr. Kohl and his infamous 1 Ostmark = 1 D-mark), BUBA reacted by being ultra hawkish, which in turn led to two German recessions and the ousting of Mr. Kohl. Warning shots have already been fired through comments from Otmar Issing and Hannes Tietmaier a while back in the German press.


  17. @Henrik

    And the true opinion of BUBA was recently communicated by Thilo Sarazzin.

  18. Henrik,

    Everything you say is true. The real issue, however, is whether Stark is saying this to a German, Greek or European public. The Greek 10-year yield managed to drop around 25 points on the week as did the spread to the bund. In other words, the market’s assessment of this hawkishness was to immediately get long Greek debt – and going the other way when Germany talks tough has been a winning trade throughout the crisis, by the way. If the message he was trying to convey is to be taken literally, the event was an abject failure.

  19. @govs from Latvia:

    I think I got your point. True, German economy is very competitive. But it’s not Germany’s guilt. It’s been the fault of Greece or Latvia. These countries either had euro or peg to euro. This had dramatically increased their money supply from 2001 to 2008, and therefore has been the cause of property price bubble, fast wage growth and thus decline of competitiveness.

    You simply shouldn’t have pegged your currency to euro. The Greeks should not have adopted it. Were the lat or the drachma allowed to devalue, both countries could be in much better shape now.

    The Germans are not guilty on this case.

  20. @Pavel

    Latvia could not choose itself to peg or not to peg, it was imposed in underground by the EU. Latvia pegged one year after EE, LT, because doubts about it existed already then. We could be rescued if the lat could REVALUE during massive inflow, as in CZ and PL. This did not happen. The main cause why we can not devalue is the 82% share of EUR loans in LV, similar to EE and LT.

    However, regarding the competitiveness of the German economy I would like to support the critical demand-side position of Flassbeck. It is just not normal, according to every macro-economic theory, if a big country as Germany gains competitiveness by extreme long-lasting permanent wage dumping. This works internally in the very hierarchical German society, because the dumping is based on cuts for middle and lower classes. But this is not sustainable in a Union as the EU.

    The condition sine non qua is a free trade agreement allowing to export German goods freely, otherwise other countries will profit by imposing custom taxes. This can work for some time if the importing EU countries are somehow compensated and subsidized on the monetary side.

    The Germany’s competitiveness is not based on excellent public finances. Germany is violating Stability act frequently. The competitiveness in DE is based on unique effects of mass psychology, and they are not sustainable.

    It is not about guilt here, only about sustainability.

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