Not many, but some.
One is Armenia. The Armenians are annoyed at the Georgians for their generally shoddy treatment of the Armenian minority in Georgia. More to the point, Armenians generally look down their magnificent noses at Georgians, considering them self-indulgent, emotional, shrill, slovenly, unreliable, and just generally second-rate. Georgians don’t love Armenians either — they consider them sly, stuck-up and grasping. There are no exactly equivalent Western European stereotypes, but if you think “dour Scots versus hand-waving Italians” you’ll get the general idea.
The state of relations between the two peoples is such that, when a rumor arose that the Russians were using Armenian air bases to bomb them, it was immediately and widely believed by the Georgians. (It wasn’t true.)
At the same time, most Armenians have warm feelings towards Russia. Which warm feelings are not entirely requited — Russians don’t view Armenians with a lot of affection and respect — but that’s another story. Imperial Russia rescued them from the Turks, after all, and then the USSR allowed Armenia to industrialize and Armenians to rise almost to the top of the Soviet hierarchy.
There’s a widespread belief in Armenia that Russia tilts their way in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute… probably not true, but there it is. More to the point, there are a couple of thousand Russian soldiers in Armenia; it doesn’t get a lot of publicity, but they’ve been there since the 1990s, quietly watching Armenia’s border with Turkey. Drive south from Yerevan, and you’ll see their bases, Russian flags and all.
And then of course, there’s Nagorno-Karabakh. The Armenians are grimly determined to hang on to NK. So they have a strong interest in seeing some post-Soviet boundary changes. If Russia claws off South Ossetia and Abkhazia, not just de facto but de jure, that’ll be a powerful precedent in Armenia’s favor.
All that said, Armenia’s position in the recent conflict has been… nuanced. You see, Armenia’s borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan are closed. They have a land border with Iran, but it’s short, and crossed by a single two-lane road that closes every winter. So, pretty much everything that goes in or out of Armenia — including the single rail line, the single highway, the single fiber-optic cable, and the microwave phone link — goes through Georgia. 90% of their imports come in through Georgia, and about 95% of their exports go out that way. The Georgian port of Poti is Armenia’s window on the world. Simply put, Armenia is a man trying to eat, drink and breathe through a fairly narrow hose. If the Georgians were to become sufficiently annoyed, they could devastate Armenia’s economy overnight.
So, while Armenian public opinion is firmly on Russia’s side, the Armenian government is playing it safe. They’re a friendly neutral to Russia, coolly correct to Georgia.
Over in the Balkans, a similar situation prevails in Serbia. Though for somewhat different reasons. The Serbs think of themselves as having a special relationship with Russia. This is partly for historical reasons, but mostly because the last two governments have banged the “Russia will come to our rescue!” drum really hard. Russia has backed Serbia firmly on Kosovo; the Russian veto is not the only thing keeping Kosovo from general international recognition and a seat in the UN, but it’s by far the most important.
So, Serbian public opinion is pretty pro-Russian… but the current Serbian government is a lot more circumspect. That’s because the current Serbian government is (I am simplifying here) pro-Western. In a Serbian context, that means they’re… not anti-Russian, but a lot less pro-Russian than the previous government or the current opposition.
One odd thing: logically, the Serbs should be supporting Georgia, since Abkhaz or Ossetian independence, never mind their annexation by Russia, would be a real threat to their legal and political position in Kosovo. If Russia seriously tries to convince the world that Abkhazia should be independent, it’s going to be noticeably harder to insist that Kosovo shouldn’t be. Looking down the road a few years, it’s not hard to imagine a grand bargain by which Russia sells out Kosovo in return for general recognition of its territorial claims in Georgia. A few thoughtful Serbs have pointed this out, but at the moment their voices are being drowned out by the chorus of “go team Slav”.
Russia has other friends on this issue: Mongolia, Belarus, some of the central Asian states. But that takes us out of Europe, and anyway this post is long enough. Key point: while most of Europe is viewing Russia’s actions askance, not every country is seeing things in the same light as Poland or Estonia.