Well I think we’ve come about as far down the road on this one for the time being as we can. I’m convinced there is a break point at 1.5 and that it’s irresponsible to let fertility drift below that, and you aren’t. So my whole reading of what happened post 1988 is coloured by that. Now we will have to let history be our judge.

OTOH, I think thanks to you I do have the mortality picture much clearer, as I have the fact that widespread abuse of abortion has lead to higher infertility. It was never my intention to defend Breznev and co.

On the bigger issue, I am a bit like Luther nailing his manifesto to the wall. I think it is inevitable that all societies drift down below the 2.1 mark, but I think it is possible, via immigration policies and pro family policies to hold a line at around 1.7 – 1.9. I think this is a lesson we have learnt, and we have to campaign now to try and have policies put in place to prevent more third world countries following the other route. I don’t think one should be complacent in the face of this turn in events.

So here is something:

http://www.rand.org/publications/CF/CF124/CF124.chap2.html

If you look at Figure 2.6, there is a clear trend toward dropping fertility till about 1980 or so, then an uptick to 1987, then a crash. Since I don’t accept mystical meaning for the value 1.5, it sure seems to be like a decline followed by an uptick, followed by an even steeper decline.

So matching this with mortality, it’s clear that the real statistical craziness is what was going on in the 80s. That’s got to be the beginnings of perestroika and the anti-vodka campaign.

So I don’t think you can blame this all on the Soviet collapse. It seems to me that the collapse started under Brezhnev.

10% of Estonians were sent to the gulags. Who knows how many other Baltics, Poles, Germans, and Ukranians ended up there. While they definitely were bad for Russians as well, they were also bad for anyone Russia managed to conquer, if even only for a little while.

@Edward,

Here’s the thing. I don’t agree with your interpretation. It’s clear that mortality rates started to increase in the late 70′s and early 80′s. Mortality decreased with the anti-vodka campaigns of Gorbachev, which shows that a significant number of Russians were essentially drinking themselves to death. With the end of the anti-vodka campaign, this got worse and worse and was exacerbated by the events of 1989-91. So increased mortality can not solely be blamed on the collapse of the Soviet Union, despite what so many people seem to want to believe. I don’t like simplistic explanations either, and I think people want a simplistic explanation for the increased mortality. The fall of the Soviet Union isn’t the whole story.

As for fertility, it has always been my understanding that fertility rates were declining in the late 70s and early 80s and increased in the late 80s with Gorbachev’s efforts at reform and the anti-vodka campaign and then went back to their earlier trends. Since the article you quote doesn’t actually show the graphs, I need to find them myself. I’ll get back to you on this, but I have to verify this for myself.

“If Russia’s economy maintains a reasonable level of growth (primarily fueled by the energy/resource sector) and at the same time Russia’s population declines in the order of 50% to something around the 70-80 million mark, won’t those remaining be twice as well off as if Russia’s population level had remained steady at 143 million?”

Well, this depends on the value of petroleum, and how it evolves.

Assuming it stays at the present level in real terms there may be more to share round per capita, sure, but who says the politicians and criminals will be strong on sharing. I just read a paper which does talk about Russia in these terms – as a sort of post modern petro-economy – but look at the problems this produces in the pre-modern variety.

Also remember the ageing and health-related problems. And if we come off petrol 50 years from now……

To put things in perspective I just read that if you look at the non oil/raw material parts of the economy, then the Republic of Ireland has something like 4 times the value of exports that Russia has. That I think speaks volumes about the ‘real economy’ there.

“Wouldn’t that turn Russia into a country approaching Western European levels of per capita GDP?”

I don’t think so, but then that depends what the EU levels of GDP are by say 2050, since lots of member states have problems which are not *that* far removed from Russia’s. I think the oil money is only really going to be important for the ability it gives some people to play, and probably dangerous games at that.

Seems doubtful to me.

How much of Russia’s economy is actually based on resources/oil ? How much do these contribute to growth ? How long will Russian oil last ? How much of that money will Russian people get ?

If, on the other hand, growth would have to come from industry and services, it will be linked to the size of the Russian working-age population. If that goes down steeply, it will be difficult to maintain total GDP growth, even if GDP per capita increases.

As for per capita GDP, that an interesting way of looking at things. Glass half full anyone?

Wouldn’t that turn Russia into a country approaching Western European levels of per capita GDP?

And, a question, from someone who is quite dumb when it comes to demographics:

If Russia’s economy maintains a reasonable level of growth (primarily fueled by the energy/resource sector) and at the same time Russia’s population declines in the order of 50% to something around the 70-80 million mark, won’t those remaining be twice as well off as if Russia’s population level had remained steady at 143 million?

The Spectre of Immigration

See – The Spectre of Immigration