WHT n Gd grn rth r y pssbly tlkng bt?

sssntn? Y’v gt prtty ctv mgntn… nd hw wld Prsdnt Bdn hlp nythng?

LL

This is your only warning.

I think we place too much emphasis on the events on the street because those are the events we see. I don’t mean to say they aren’t important, just that they aren’t decisive. They’re background and pressure: think of the journées of the French Revolution. They affect, but don’t necessarily determine, events, actions and decisions we don’t see.

I actually agree with you that Serbia is a much better comparison. Just not Serbia in 2000.

Keep in mind that Serbia went through two waves of street protests — in 1991 and again in 1997 — before 2000. Both the first two waves were unsuccessful, though they did nudge the regime a little. It took complete economic collapse plus a lost war to finally bring Slobo down, and even then he only lost because he’d let himself get dangerously out of touch and isolated.

Iran hasn’t lost a war; in fact, their strategic position is, thanks to us, far better than it was before 2003. Their economy has serious problems, but that’s been true almost nonstop since the Revolution. I’m just not sensing that Iranians feel the festering sense of national failure that helped motivate the Serbs to bring down Slobo.

Note that by 2000, perhaps third of all Serbs passively supported Milosevic, but without enthusiasm, while a somewhat larger number — between a third and half — couldn’t stand him any more. Maybe 20% violently hated his goddamn guts; there was no equivalently passionate support for him on the other side. This is very different from Iran, where violent loathing for Ahmedinejad is matched by equally violent support for him.

Doug M.

Iran’s urban middle class (in the broad sense of the term) is far more important than in Zimbabwe. Iran is 70% urban. Zimbabwe is 62% rural. Compare income, internet access, literacy… it’s a different story. I think the closest example to Iran’s situation would be Serbia, if anything.

Nobody in this story has overpowering charisma that would be enough to settle the crisis. Neither Khamenei nor Moussavi. Ahmedinejad is perhaps the most charismatic but is also hated and despised. In short, the allegiance of the armed forces to head figures is not guarantied.

And you are right – if oil prices crash, there’s no reason to gloat, we are all in the tank. But even if they fall to a reasonable US50 Iran is in trouble. A regime with no outside backers cannot afford to lose legitimacy in a time like this.

Warning: it’s rather long.

Palin 2012, doodz! (with or without Jindal who, let’s face it, was always expendable.)