Unlike the West Russia didn’t have the luxury to wait 8 years. They needed an excuse to keep Western peacekeepers out, they needed a fast end so that the issue would not keep poisoning their relation with the West and unlike the West they didn’t have a sceptical domestic audience that needed to be convinced that “all options had been exhausted”.

My guess is that the Georgians are lucky that Russia now had the option of recognition. Without it the Russians would have felt the need to punish the Georgians more in other ways. We may yet see it if the Georgians are so stupid to try another attack. The Russian retaliation will then be much more brutal.

@Jussi Jalonen:
I think you put too much importance on Kosovo. Since 1991 Georgia regularly tried to regain control over the whole or a part of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Saakashvili also “needed” to attack for electoral reasons. According to Der Spiegel the Georgian plan of attack on South Ossetia dated from 2006. The Russian policy before the war was mainly one of deterrence of an expected Georgian attack.

http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,574812,00.html
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,578273,00.html

Can you can elaborate on that “murky part” and those “public statements of the Duma and the Russian government” and why they contributed to the escalation? It is difficult to discuss in abstractions.

After March 2008, the escalation was steady, and both the South Ossetians as well as Russians made continuous references to the Kosovo issue. Since the Russians had stated already before that they’d regard Kosovar independence as a message and act accordingly… well, it’s just an inductive conclusion that they would act as soon as they’d have their pretext.

Of course, there was also another practical, more concrete matter that took place at the same time; the Georgian attempt to enter the NATO, which was probably an even more important signal to Russia.

Cheers,

J. J.

That said, I don’t see strong evidence that either party’s behavior was influenced by what happened with Kosovo in February.

Doug M.

Thus, the question “If Kosovo had not declared independence last February, what would Russia have done in the recent Georgia crisis?” makes no sense, because the default assumption should be that if Kosovo had not declared independence in the first place, there _would have been no Georgia crisis at all_.

(Ha-ha, I can do this far better than your usual wingnuts.)

That being said: Russia did play its own murky part in the escalation of the Caucasian crisis from February onwards, and in retrospect, it would seem that the escalation did accelerate at least somewhat after the Kosovar declaration of independence. The public statements of the Duma and the Russian government from February 2008 onwards are indicative, and it seems that they were proceeding in sync with the steady, but serious escalation of hostilities on the ground.

So, right now, in retrospect, it would seem that the Kosovar declaration of independence did have an immediate impact on the Russian policy in Caucasus, thus contributing to the escalation and the final culmination of the crisis. Having a deliberately complicated historian’s view on these things, I find it rather difficult to imagine the South Ossetian war erupting in a similar fashion in a world where the Kosovar independence has not taken place at all. We’re living an era when these conflicts are inevitably internationalized.

Some people might once again state that the war was launched by Saakashvili, and that he would have done so anyway. That would, in my opinion, be an overstatement; true, Saakashvili did take the decisive step, but at the time, he was nonetheless acting in reaction to the situation which had unfolded for six months. Obviously, in a timeline proposed by Douglas above, the situation might have very well been different.

So, I have a feeling that this may not be the best possible counterfactual, given that we just don’t know all the details yet. Right now, this seems - to me - a bit like asking how the United States would have dealt with stagflation in a world where the Yom Kippur War would not have taken place.

In short: the poll is anachronistic. I have to go with that undefined “other”-option.

Cheers,

J. J.

Hmm, if you’re so principle people, now it should be a time to recognise Kosovo. Just to be so principe to the end.

No, not “Nuf’ said.”

You obviously no nothing about Russia. If you did, you wouldn’t make asinine comments.

Actually, Russia has been quite principled in this conflict with Georgia. It’s Saakashvili is the unstable aggressor who unilaterally shelled a bunch of sleeping civilians.

Russia’s FIRST move was to convene a Security Counsel meeting asking for both sides to agree to a binding non-use of force agreement. Both Saak and Washington refused. Russia then whacked Saak hard as they were right to do.

I remind you and other Russophobes out there that Russia is NOT expansionist. Since the break-up of the Soviet Union Russia has shrunk, not expanded. Russia has zero interest in attacking or overthrowing any countries whether they be on Russia’s borders or anywhere else around the world.

You’re entitled not to like Russia on an emotional basis but you are not entitled to twisting the facts regarding Russia.

Ah, the principled Russians! They will soon recognize Kosovo, right? We have plenty of tapes of what happened in Kosovo, no need to rely on second hand info like in Ossetia.

Russians are Russians. Nuf’ said.

Your poll is based on false premise.

Moscow did not say that they were recognizing S.O. and Abkhazia because the West recognized Kosovo.

Rather, Moscow recognized these two regions AFTER Saakashvili attacked South Ossetia because Moscow, correctly, believed that it would be impossible for the two regions to ever become part of Georgia.

Moscow has stated that it would have preferred if the international community could have gotten together and hammered out some ground rules for break-away regions seeking independence BEFORE the West unilaterally recognized Kosovo’s independence.

Thus, you should have another answer which would read:

* Moscow would not have recognized South Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s independence if Saakashvili had not attacked Tskinval but rather would have continued to push for a pledge of the non-use of force and a negotiated settlement.