Since the term ‘Finlandisation’ is mentioned, won’t posters here begin to remind you of Finland’s route of appeasement?

For the record, people abuse that word too much.

Obviously, some other countries have different historical experiences, and in that light, their decisions are understandable.

Still, it’s difficult for me to understand why Ukraine would somehow be dependent on the NATO. Considering the hardware and manpower in their disposal, the possibility of Russia “redrawing the map of Ukraine” should be rather marginal.

(What, there are national and regional cleavages within Ukraine? Smooth them over. Other nations have managed it, with far worse handicap.)

As for the NATO membership and its importance to the East European states in general; one could ask the purely pragmatic question why the NATO membership was so important to countries such as the Czech Republic, Bulgaria or Slovenia. None of these countries share a border with Russia, nor have they been facing any other plausible security threats.

The only reason that I can think for their membership of is the desire to prove that “we’re _western_”… which, incidentally, also happens to be the emotional argument posed by the Finnish pro-NATO faction, and one that I personally disagree with.

There are valid reasons to support the NATO membership, but lack of self-confidence and problems of self-identification are not valid reasons.

Cheers,

J. J.

“There are countries right next to Russia which manage quite nicely without the umbrella of the NATO. Half a million trained reservists, a territorial defence policy and a working dialogue with Moscow seem to be a sufficient security guarantee.”

Finland, and …?

For now, I see this whole “reicorporating Crimea” business as nothing more than ultranationalist chirping.

No former Eastern Block country has joined the EU first without first joining the NATO? As I said, that just proves that those countries were more interested in the NATO instead of the EU; also, it proves that the NATO procedures for accepting new member states are (slightly) faster than those of the EU.

Of the fourth point, of the countries mentioned at least Bosnia-Herzegovina seems likely to entre the EU before the NATO. The country has been a de facto EU satrapy since forever, and is already on its road towards candidacy. At the same time, the erstwhile occupation authority has offered Bosnia only “intensified dialogue”.

There’s no link between the EU and the NATO; there’s not even a _working consensus_ between these two institutions. This fact was rather painfully demonstrated during the Yugoslavian wars of successions, and even more recently in the case of Cyprus, where the interests of one NATO member and one EU member continue to clash openly.

When it comes to Ukraine, the NATO is obviously not going to brush the country off the MAP, so there’s no need to worry about that. But I have to say that even if the NATO did that, the idea of “Russia redrawing Ukraine’s map” would still seem rather unlikely. Unless, of course, the Ukrainians themselves allow it to happen.

There are countries right next to Russia which manage quite nicely without the umbrella of the NATO. Half a million trained reservists, a territorial defence policy and a working dialogue with Moscow seem to be a sufficient security guarantee.

Cheers,

J. J.

While NATO membership has its intrinsic security value, it also has its instrumental value: common values and governance standards.

1. Of the 27 EU members, 21 are NATO members, including all major European countries;

2. Turkey joined NATO during the Cold War despite civilizational differences;

3. No former Eastern Bloc country has joined the EU without first joining NATO;

4. Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Albania are unlikely to join the EU prior to joining NATO.

For Ukraine, the values/governance bootcamp is NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP). If NATO brushes Ukraine off on MAP, it will encourage Russia to redraw Ukraine’s map.

This means NATO will have to spend more on defense, gas, and humanitarian aid.

Okay, I can see that. Ukraine had a longer history as a part of the USSR and the communist bloc; so, I guess that it makes sense that the locals would view the NATO in a different light than people in Estonia or Poland - many of whom supported the NATO, but opposed the EU.

But of that other matter, I still think that he’s wrong. The NATO membership is not, and has never been any kind of a prerequisite for the EU membership, not even for the East European countries. And I don’t understand how one can somehow draw that kind of a conclusion.

When it comes to the 2004 round, countries such as Estonia and Slovenia joined the NATO and the EU practically _simultaneously_. The membership applications proceeded completely separately of each others, and there was an interval of few weeks between their accession to the NATO and the EU. Assuming that the spring term of the NATO calendar ended in June instead of April, those countries would have become EU members first, and East European bloggers would presumably be arguing that hey, an EU membership is obviously a prerequisite to the NATO membership.

Besides, that was a period of a cold spell in the Euro-Atlantic relations, so I really, really can’t understand the conclusion that the NATO membership and the EU membership were somehow part of the same package.

The fact is that the NATO is not a stepping-stone to the EU, even if some (apparently misinformed) people now insist on seeing it as such. How well has it worked for Turkey?

So. Ukraine can negotiate with the EU quite independently of the NATO, and even forget the NATO membership completely if the population so desires.

And I’m willing to bet good money that the Serbian public will accept the idea of the EU membership a lot sooner than the idea of their NATO membership.

Cheers,

J. J.

Since the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, joining NATO has become a prerequisite — the prerequisite — for joining the EU. No Eastern European country has become an EU member without first becoming a NATO member.

I believe that Ukraine’s nonalignment puts us in the danger zone. I want Ukraine to join NATO and, ultimately, the EU while remaining a good neighbor of Russia, not a good banana republic of Russia.

It’s tough not to draw such a conclusion by the non-NATO countries. Unless…unless of course the EU (end-goal) offered some kind of steps, mechanism, framework that these countries can use to integrate with the EU in the long-term.

Right now this is missing; Brussels and interested states go through the motions, attend summits and sign pieces of parchment, but ultimately there is no mechanism that is an alternative to the function that NATO has served over the past decade and a half.

Those that are proposed, like the Eastern Partnership Plan by Poland and Sweden, are relegated to secondary importance. That’s too bad. The EU has a lot to gain from engaging with its neighbors, if only it stepped up to the plate.