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	<title>Comments on: The Transition is Over</title>
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	<link>http://fistfulofeuros.net/afoe/europe-and-the-world/the-transition-is-over/</link>
	<description>European Opinion</description>
	<pubDate>Wed, 07 Jan 2009 21:03:26 +0000</pubDate>
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		<title>By: eulogist</title>
		<link>http://fistfulofeuros.net/afoe/europe-and-the-world/the-transition-is-over/#comment-18323</link>
		<dc:creator>eulogist</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 02 Dec 2007 23:51:49 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://fistfulofeuros.net/afoe/the-european-union/the-transition-is-over#comment-18323</guid>
		<description>Your last paragraph struck me, as some of the opposition against the strengthening of the EU's human rights instruments (the Charter on, and the Agency for, Fundamental Rights) was founded on the argument that it could undermine the Council of Europe's Court of Human Rights' position and clout. Because if the EU would start handling most or practically all of its own human rights cases through its own institutions, the inevitable result is that an even larger share of the cases handled by the Council of Europe would have to do with Russia and the rest of Eastern Europe. It would definitely strengthen the case of those on the Russian side who argue the Court's efforts are "unbalanced" because it handles fewer cases from Western Europe.

Diplomacy (which is all the Court is about, after all) is always a matter of being able to give as well as take, in order to give the other side the opportunity to grudgingly accept something unwanted without losing too much face. 

The same case can be made for the OSCE and its ODIHR. Which means ODIHR needs to be strengthened and kept in the OSCE, much rather than moving it to the EU.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Your last paragraph struck me, as some of the opposition against the strengthening of the EU&#8217;s human rights instruments (the Charter on, and the Agency for, Fundamental Rights) was founded on the argument that it could undermine the Council of Europe&#8217;s Court of Human Rights&#8217; position and clout. Because if the EU would start handling most or practically all of its own human rights cases through its own institutions, the inevitable result is that an even larger share of the cases handled by the Council of Europe would have to do with Russia and the rest of Eastern Europe. It would definitely strengthen the case of those on the Russian side who argue the Court&#8217;s efforts are &#8220;unbalanced&#8221; because it handles fewer cases from Western Europe.</p>
<p>Diplomacy (which is all the Court is about, after all) is always a matter of being able to give as well as take, in order to give the other side the opportunity to grudgingly accept something unwanted without losing too much face. </p>
<p>The same case can be made for the OSCE and its ODIHR. Which means ODIHR needs to be strengthened and kept in the OSCE, much rather than moving it to the EU.</p>
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