I’d just like to thank you all for participating in a lively and fruitful discussion. You may wonder why I bother putting so much energy into these threads. I think the answer is simple, it helps get things clearer in my mind. When there is civilised debate you can see all the objections and holes in the theories.

On this. I would say Ray’s objection which I didn’t initially grasp, and which was in a different way articulated by Hektor on the parrallel Rusian Demography thread, is an important one. What they are really asking for is an explanation of why TFRs won’t climb up again in the relevant time window. This objection hasn’t been answered here. What we have done is define the terms, and these may now be used to explore the argument further. I think there are reasons why this inability to make a comeback might be the case, and I will try and explore these in a separate post after the holdidays.

I think, in scientific terms, once you notice a repeat phenomenon - like people ‘going under’ and not coming back - it is a valid procedure to begin to formulate a hypothesis. However to go from this hypothesis to a full blown theory you need more, you need reasons, and eventually you need models. It is this ‘more’ that is being worked on as you read. Have a good summer everyone.

Just because pen we accept that taxation in general should serves a redistributive social purpose does not preclude the odd exception in the allocation of spending in order to pursue other social desiderata.

http://www.bib-demographie.de/info/bib_broschuere2.pdf

Lots of interesting points, both historically (e.g. the effect of the Great Depression on the Birth rate was similar to the World Wars) and about the present situation.

For example, a large percentage of women have no children, while those that do get children tend to have more than one.

Plenty of questionable assumptions too. Concerning large families, one should not assume that an average 2.1 children is going to be achieved without a percentage (10-15% ?) of families having 4 or 5 kids, and without active child support, there?s a risk to those families of falling into poverty. Do the statistics show that the number of larger families is the most pronounced area of decline, or is the sharpest problem a shift in the mode ? i.e more families having 1 kid rather than 2 ? Or is the most detectable change in the other tail ? people with no kids at all? There are policy implications for how pro-natality resources are targeted.

Generally a support policy like Switzerland?s with the emphasis on tax allowances favours the rich, whereas per child payments (relatively) favour the poor. Support for nannies is good for those who can afford a nanny in the first place ? and for busy professional women who want to stay in work despite a large family, since it incorporates some domestic labour. Free cr?ches are more widely relevant ? but not if the problem we most want to solve is the relative infertility of the better educated. I think all this would have been clearer if I hadn?t tried and failed to imbed the links.

A while ago, in an argument elsewhere with Bulgarian nationalists, I posted this study http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/migrant/download/imp/imp39.pdf which looked at the composition of Bulgarian emigration and return migration. I can see why the Government wants to play down the emigration, and stress the return migration of non-Turks. There is popular anxiety about the country being ?taken over by Gypsies?. Note the out-of-the-blue success of Ataka in the elections.

I see some questionable implications here:

Do you mean this at the society level (poor vs.rich countries) or at the level of individual families ?

And please, why should you give preference for one or the other ?

Reproduction level would be 2.x children per family. Do you call that “large” ?

An issue not adressed is divorce rates and the poor porspects of children outside full families.

Just because we accept that taxation in general should serves a redistributive social purpose does not preclude the odd exception in the allocation of spending in order to pursue other social desiderata.

You seem to prefer taxation as a resdistributive tool to direct payments. Is taxation preferable in principle, and why ?

These numbers are, as you say, dramatic. What needs to be pointed out perhaps is that *some* of these migrants are temporary. It is, if you will, offshoring in reverse. Even in the cases of those who will stay the course, remitances are important over the first years, so what they are doing is taking the labour to the capital. However all this raises issues of long run sustainability.

Bulgaria has a lot of migrants out too. It is very hard to get accurate numbers. Even the census may not help because people who are ‘temporarily’ out may still be classified as residents. Also the governments try to play down the exodus. You should know better about Romania, but 2 million wouldn’t be impossible judging by Bulgaria where there may be anything up to a million out from a population of 8-9 million. Pensions is one of the issues. The young go out to work to send money back to their elderly dependent relatives.

Incidentally, in the Madrid bombings, the non-national group most affected were the Romanians. There really are a lot in Spain.

I think this is the one John. The arrival of the pill, emancipation, crashing through the glass ceiling (as opposed to the mirrored one, Oh, that would be Lampton ). The opening of career opportunities, taking all that education potential beyond the age of 18. This is the issue, and the declining fertility that goes with trying to have the children later in life. So, if you want a ‘targeted intervention’ this is where it would have to come.

The point is a country like Britain has the luxury of still being able to do something, since the demography is still not catastrophic. When I speak of ‘liquidity constraints’ I am applying a theory which has been developed to describe individual behaviour to the state/society level. Italy simply cannot finance this kind of policy, since its level of indebtedness is already too high (and about to get worse), it’s difficult to see what is the way out there. What the UK needs is ‘just in time’ natality.