Indeed comparing to the the South American way is not the lest as silly as as the WWI race; should had read your most more thoroughly (btw very interesting and informative about boats, and also your blog in general)

But I still think there’s a crucial difference between the S. American battleship buil-up and the European LDP one, namely that the former was competetive and the latter cooperative.
Another is that the first was totally devoid of military purpose, while the only realistic major mission that Europeans navies could be called upon is projecting expeditionary forces.
You correctly state both those facts.

While I could accept the prestige argument “but they got one, I want mine too” would be valid within, say, some navy circles of the more atavistic kind, I doubt most policy-makers would see prestige in ships designated by acronyms, not to speak of the general public.

As for constructivism and realism, I suppose you could argue for both (humanitarian and peacekeeping ideals resp. the preserving Europe as a major military power in the world).
I don’t why, but all those theories remind me of the story about the blind scientists and the elephant.

No direspect, but I’m not much into ismism. I would much admire a country that had as the theoretical basis for its international relations, that Old West motto, “to ride, shoot straight, and speak the truth”.

(no, I don’t mean Bush doctrine; the Texas saying for that would be “all hat and no cattle”)

To clarify, my argument had nothing to do with traditional arms race dynamics (we must have an LPD to defend against the Spanish one), but took rather a more constructivist turn (we ought to have an LPD because so many countries of our size have one). This is where I suggest that there might be some similarity with the pre-1914 experience (which is best captured, incidentally, not by the UK-German dreadnought race but by the Brazil-Argentina-Chile competition).

But yes, I agree that the vessels now being purchased by European and extra-European countries are genuinely more useful than the dreadnoughts purchased by Chile and Argentina. I’m not convinced, though, that the motivations for building these ships are better explained by realist or constructivist principles.

That lawyers, guns and money post reflects a typical American view (doctrine) of excessive (overwhelming )firepower, that anything but at least twelve giant nuclear carrier groups is pointless. Walnuts and sledgehammers…

And, taken together, the European amphibious fleet is substantial, with:

o one British Ocean-class Landing Platform Helicopter, two Albion-class Landing Platform Dock, four Bay-class LPD (to replace the Round Table-class LSL), and six Point-class (semi-military) ro-ro ships

o one French Jeanne D’Arc-class helicopter carrier, two Foudre-class and two Mistral-class LPD,

o three Italian San-Giorgio-class LPD

o two Spanish Enforcer-class LPD and two Newport-class LST

o two Dutch Enforcer-class LPD

o one Portugese Enforcer-class LPD

for a total of 22 amphibious ships plus the six British ro-ro’s.

The US navy has more than 40 amphibious ships of all kinds, so that there is fair probability that there is one or two at sea not too far from any eventual hotspot. Obviously, a navy with just one or couple of ships is quite meaningless, as it can be at only one place at a time, but that’s the whole purpose of coordinating the Europeans navies so they can achieve an operational capability together. Calling that an arm race is just silly.

@Charley: Which is why the Argentine air force won the Falklands War, right?