And to the extent that anyone on the outside pays attention to Cyprus, the last thing they will have heard is that the Greek Cypriots scuppered the last deal; it’s hard to hold that against Turkey.

Anyway, effective EU involvement in any internal Iraqi matter will require politicians to pull their heads out of the sand, where EU policy on Iraq seems still to be made. Public interest wouldn’t hurt, but with the only thing on Iraq I see in German media is “the Americans are screwing the pooch,” I wouldn’t hold out hope for a policy that articulates, let alone pursues, European interests.

Europe hasn’t had an Iraq policy for the better part of a decade, why start now?

Since Turkey is occupying Cyprus, blockading the border with Armenia, threatening to invade Iraq, and has recently threatened to go to war with both Greece and Syria, is this provision going to be used with Turkey?

The reason the Kurdish political class is getting more hardline is that they are feeling pressure from Kurdish society. That pressure is arising because the average Kurdish man on the street has no confidence that the US and UK won’t turn over Iraq to another murderous autocrat (possibly Iyad Alawi) or to a bunch of religious fundamentalists (Moktada Al-Sadr and even Al-Sistani on a bad day), either of which would be very bad for the Kurdish people. And let’s not fool ourselves – bad for the Kurdish people means mass graves and massacres. Meanwhile, Turkey is threatening to invade should the Kurds even keep their substantial autonomy, and might impose an economic blockade like the one it is using to strangle Armenia, who they seem to feel hasn’t suffered enough at the hands of the Turks.

The longer the uncertainty remains, the more the hardliners will gain power, especially since the moderates have nothing to show for their moderation.

A similar dynamic is occuring in Kosovo, where the only people to materially improve the situation of the Albanian supermajority are the hardliners. Rugova did civil disobedience for eight years, and nobody cared, while the Serbs systematically purged Albanians from all the institutions and good jobs. But a little rebellion, and suddenly Kosovo is de facto independent.

Then of course, the good bureaucrats in the EU and UN begin to stall, saying there needs to be a development of structures and local self-government, but meanwhile let’s leave the status of independence because it could upset people. But this limbo means that there is no economic investment and no international recognition, so everything is in limbo. Of course, if the hardliners burn down a few homes of Serbs, then suddenly the EU, US, and UN start paying attention again.

The only way to give moderate political forces power is to give them something for their moderation. That’s what we need to do for the Kurds, by enforcing the TAL or giving them their own regional government enshrined in the law, and we need to do the same thing for Kosovo, because there is no chance of the 90% Albanian majority living under Serbia again.

Frankly, we don’t need the Turks nearly as much as they need us, and it is probably about time we started acting that way.

I, however, have no confidence that the EU has the backbone to make such a statement. It is far more likely that they will mutter about Islam and adultery and dither, solving none of the problems.

Meanwhile, foreign minister Gul said that the situation makes Turkish position in Iraq difficult. By the “Turkish position” he was referring to the hundreds of Turkish companies working in Iraq and the US’ Incirilik air base which is currently providing logistic support. He said if unwarranted attacks on the Turkomen continue, Turkey would have to pull out its companies and restrict US’ ability to use Incirlik. He said he got word from Powell that such operations would in fact stop.

I think the Turkish government knows any military action into Iraq would be a fiasco, and it knows the consternation it would recieve from the international community. Most are wary of Turkey using minorities as an excuse for strategic military action (ie Cyprus)…

Point taken. But doesn’t this simply illustrate the problem. Just what role will these groups have in the Kurdish zone in even a ‘most positive outcome’ federal Iraq state, or the Sadr militias in the South, or extremist terrorists (as opposed to moderate nationalists) in Chechenya, or the UCK in Kossovo etc etc.

I am suggesting that there is a pretty delicate dynamic involved here, and that this seems to be a problem which needs addressing, and solutions need to be found. As you suggest, to date we are not going about this in a way which suggests we are learning any lessons.

Here’s the

http://www.pbs.org/wnet/extremeoil/

I was reminded of how Baku played a central role at the close of WWI and through Russian Civil War as a point of interest for many parties who wanted to control its oil wealth.

Given how bad the Soviets were at exploiting oil, I’m curious how well preserved the oil fields in the Caspian, etc. are.

That can be awoided easily: by not talking about ‘the Kurds’, but about ‘the Peshmergas’, or ‘armed members of PUK, KDP, and some smaller groups’, or some similar formulation.

As for your main issue, I have to admit Iraq is an explosive issue for Turkey’s domestic developments. AFAIK Turkey is already in Iraq, against a marginalised Kongra-Gel (ex PKK) that thought this is the time to stir the pot again, but fighting the main Iraqi Kurdish militias might just be what gets support for the Kongra-Gel up in Turkey – and given the role played by the Turkish military in the Cyprus issue, I can’t dismiss the possibility of willful [domestic] escalation by that side either.

So maybe the EU can have (and definitely should try to have) a tempering effect, but the main problem is beyond its influence – and Iraq’s American overlords show a frightening pattern of doing wrong everything that can be done wrong, with Najaf and Tal Afar the latest examples. I wonder, could a President Kerry be explained what’s the problem? (I’m not optimistic.)