And it’s true that one or two bombs are no good to bully the neighbours – they’d rightly believe you’d not launch them unless you’re desperate, for the reasons you cite. They are excellent though if you are in fact desperate and everyone knows it, so they are an effective deterrent against actual invasion.

The Israel-as-an-extended deterrer theory works at its best against potential nuclear powers: a state might refrain from developing nuclear weapons, for fear of pre-emptive (non-nuclear) Israeli action.

In Iran’s case, however, the point remains that having the option to develop nuclear weapons remains a far more potent bargaining chip than actually having them would be. With a civilian (but readily weaponizable) nuclear program, their position remains ambiguous enough that it difficult to convince the world that something ought to be done about them. Meanwhile, they can saber-rattle the price of oil up almost as effectively as they could as an actual nuclear power.