Comments on: Chirac has a transient dishonesty malfunction http://fistfulofeuros.net/afoe/europe-and-the-world/chirac-has-a-transient-dishonesty-malfunction/ European Opinion Thu, 04 Dec 2008 00:23:19 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.6.3 By: derrida derider http://fistfulofeuros.net/afoe/europe-and-the-world/chirac-has-a-transient-dishonesty-malfunction/#comment-17025 derrida derider Mon, 05 Feb 2007 08:25:39 +0000 http://fistfulofeuros.net/wordpress/?p=2833#comment-17025 I think this is nonsense. If Israel having the bomb wasn't sufficient motivation for the Saudis, Egypt, Syria, Jordan etc to get a bomb, its hard to see how Iran having it would be. And it's true that one or two bombs are no good to bully the neighbours - they'd rightly believe you'd not launch them unless you're desperate, for the reasons you cite. They are excellent though if you are in fact desperate and everyone knows it, so they are an effective deterrent against actual invasion. I think this is nonsense. If Israel having the bomb wasn’t sufficient motivation for the Saudis, Egypt, Syria, Jordan etc to get a bomb, its hard to see how Iran having it would be.

And it’s true that one or two bombs are no good to bully the neighbours - they’d rightly believe you’d not launch them unless you’re desperate, for the reasons you cite. They are excellent though if you are in fact desperate and everyone knows it, so they are an effective deterrent against actual invasion.

]]> By: Cyrus http://fistfulofeuros.net/afoe/europe-and-the-world/chirac-has-a-transient-dishonesty-malfunction/#comment-17024 Cyrus Mon, 05 Feb 2007 02:02:35 +0000 http://fistfulofeuros.net/wordpress/?p=2833#comment-17024 The Israel-as-an-extended-deterrer theory sounds overplayed. I think it's too strong a statement to say that a hypothetical nuclear Iran would refrain from attacking Saudi Arabia for fear of Israeli retaliation. I might, however, be able to believe that a hypothetic nuclear Iran would refrain from attacking Egypt, for fear that Israel wouldn't be able to tell it wasn't aimed at them. The Israel-as-an-extended deterrer theory works at its best against potential nuclear powers: a state might refrain from developing nuclear weapons, for fear of pre-emptive (non-nuclear) Israeli action. In Iran's case, however, the point remains that having the option to develop nuclear weapons remains a far more potent bargaining chip than actually having them would be. With a civilian (but readily weaponizable) nuclear program, their position remains ambiguous enough that it difficult to convince the world that something ought to be done about them. Meanwhile, they can saber-rattle the price of oil up almost as effectively as they could as an actual nuclear power. The Israel-as-an-extended-deterrer theory sounds overplayed. I think it’s too strong a statement to say that a hypothetical nuclear Iran would refrain from attacking Saudi Arabia for fear of Israeli retaliation. I might, however, be able to believe that a hypothetic nuclear Iran would refrain from attacking Egypt, for fear that Israel wouldn’t be able to tell it wasn’t aimed at them.

The Israel-as-an-extended deterrer theory works at its best against potential nuclear powers: a state might refrain from developing nuclear weapons, for fear of pre-emptive (non-nuclear) Israeli action.

In Iran’s case, however, the point remains that having the option to develop nuclear weapons remains a far more potent bargaining chip than actually having them would be. With a civilian (but readily weaponizable) nuclear program, their position remains ambiguous enough that it difficult to convince the world that something ought to be done about them. Meanwhile, they can saber-rattle the price of oil up almost as effectively as they could as an actual nuclear power.

]]>