Euro-European politics over #Greece

This is old news now, but it’s a good example of a theme we should be watching in the Greek negotiations – as it were, Euro-European tensions. Conflict in the EU, whether between nations, parties, lobbies, or individuals, tends to be expressed as conflict between the institutions.

So Jean-Claude Juncker has quietly said that the Commission could accept the withdrawal of the troika mission from Greece, which matters because a lot of the staff will be from the Commission. In this, of course, he’s accepted a Greek negotiating point although not a very important one.

He immediately gets a blast of verbal from Volker Kauder, the chairman of the CDU parliamentary party, who says he’s going soft and the identity of Europe is at risk and Juncker doesn’t get to decide what the Bundestag thinks. Get that combination of the identity of Europe on one hand, and pseudo-eurosceptic tractors-off-our-lawn stuff!

But then again, it’s not as if Kauder has any right to tell Juncker what to do. As he knows very well, if there is an agreement, he will have to pass the bits that affect bilateral treaties through the Bundestag, and of course he will. That’s what party whips do in life. When Merkel says so, he’ll spring to it, knowing that the job is a great platform if he wants to be chancellor one day.

There’s probably a good case to be made that the Greeks are right in trying to pick off Juncker and the Commission. The whole point of the Commission as an institution is that being in charge of the administration and the policy staff support is important. Traditionally, it gets to set the agenda, and the member states get to use a veto.

Things are more complicated these days, with the stronger parliament and the intergovernmental institutions like the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and the Eurogroup, but I for one wouldn’t bet on any final text being very heavily influenced indeed by the Commission staffers who drafted it and who will watch over its implementation.

Also, the Commission is more committed than any other institution to The Project, with which it is deliberately synonymous. And it has a lot of independence. Juncker only needs the support of his own institution to act, while even the Germans need to line up a coalition in the council of ministers or the eurogroup if they want to do anything positive.

The ECB is a bit like this, too, but it actually has less independence, as its directorate is chosen by the national central banks and actually reports back to them. By contrast, although politicians always try to give orders to European commissioners, the commission is meant to reject this.

It’s an interesting question which institution would jump which way on the question of a Cyprus-like scenario, staying in the € with capital controls in place. Both the Commission and the ECB are highly committed to keeping the project going, but it comes down to which of them is more committed to the original vision of open borders and free trade. The national finance ministers can accept a Cypriot solution most of all. Neither institution would like it, but the ECB could trigger it.

Probably, Greece is hoping to manage the ECB into not doing anything drastic, while convincing the Commission, so that the Council of Ministers can adopt a text the Commission cooks up.