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	<title>Comments on: Is The Condition of Hungary&#8217;s Economy Really As Bad As It Seems To Be?</title>
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	<link>http://fistfulofeuros.net/afoe/is-the-condition-of-hungarys-economy-really-as-bad-as-it-seems-to-be/</link>
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		<title>By: dry skin tips</title>
		<link>http://fistfulofeuros.net/afoe/is-the-condition-of-hungarys-economy-really-as-bad-as-it-seems-to-be/comment-page-1/#comment-51744</link>
		<dc:creator>dry skin tips</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 29 Oct 2011 10:16:07 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://fistfulofeuros.net/?p=5066#comment-51744</guid>
		<description>&lt;strong&gt;dry skin tips...&lt;/strong&gt;

[...]Is The Condition of Hungary&#8217;s Economy Really As Bad As It Seems To Be? &#124; afoe &#124; A Fistful of Euros &#124; European Opinion[...]...</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>dry skin tips&#8230;</strong></p>
<p>[...]Is The Condition of Hungary&#8217;s Economy Really As Bad As It Seems To Be? | afoe | A Fistful of Euros | European Opinion[...]&#8230;</p>
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		<title>By: wolff</title>
		<link>http://fistfulofeuros.net/afoe/is-the-condition-of-hungarys-economy-really-as-bad-as-it-seems-to-be/comment-page-1/#comment-24378</link>
		<dc:creator>wolff</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 16 Mar 2009 22:00:07 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://fistfulofeuros.net/?p=5066#comment-24378</guid>
		<description>Oh, I almost forgot, Schumpeter&#039;s Hungarianness is really questionable ...</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Oh, I almost forgot, Schumpeter&#8217;s Hungarianness is really questionable &#8230;</p>
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		<title>By: Wolff</title>
		<link>http://fistfulofeuros.net/afoe/is-the-condition-of-hungarys-economy-really-as-bad-as-it-seems-to-be/comment-page-1/#comment-24358</link>
		<dc:creator>Wolff</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 16 Mar 2009 13:47:57 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>It leads to the next point I would like to address (although completely as a stranger in the field), our lack of information and thorough knowledge either on the transformation process or the lasting effects of the crisis. (In case of the former it is easily imaginable that this is only relative, I’m not following the literature on this topic, but it’s clear that the problem is not addressed in the broader public.) As for the first problem, I would be interested in whether there can be distinct stages of the transformation process characterized by different economic structure, for example the higher weight of low cost industries at the beginning later the spread of finishing production and so on. As far as I encountered concepts of transformation and convergence those were uni-linear ones, presented a certain set of economic policies as universal balm for the problems and implicitly or explicitly perceived that Hungary should act accordingly at the start, keep the right direction and without further efforts or additional policies the Hungarian economy will be similar to the - let’s say - Austrian in 10-15 years. I’m not really interested in the time span, it is rather an illusion, I suspect, but it is not the real problem with this perception. If it is not completely right (and every country in the region has its ups and downs, stagnation periods etc. in the last two decades) than another question emerges, whether the present problems are simply problems of competivity or at the same time signals that a transitional phase is nearing its end making the policy proposal not as effective as it is expected? For example the ratio of high tech goods in export was far the largest in the region in Hungary, and I’m not sure that the same labor cost-competivity oriented policies would be equally effective if someone would aim at those sectors and not at car-making. There is an inflow of outsourced services in the region, but it is not making jobs as fast as industrial FDI used to. On the other hand I’m a bit concerned of the outcome of the crisis as well. Firstly I’m not convinced that in the future companies will be able to find so easily the necessary financial resources for investment, as it was common before the crisis. (Human cautiousness, tighter regulations, distrust in the innovative assets etc. can be mentioned as factors.) Even if the tightening of credit won’t last too long it would affect Hungary in a very sensitive phase. Secondly, what if the consumption patterns won’t return to those practiced before the crisis? Which sectors will be affected? (I know that we are not capable to foresee the future but is it really wise to act according to our earlier state of knowledge when we are convinced that things are profoundly changing?) And we can mention the demography as setting the limits of relatively low-cost labor oriented development as well.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It leads to the next point I would like to address (although completely as a stranger in the field), our lack of information and thorough knowledge either on the transformation process or the lasting effects of the crisis. (In case of the former it is easily imaginable that this is only relative, I’m not following the literature on this topic, but it’s clear that the problem is not addressed in the broader public.) As for the first problem, I would be interested in whether there can be distinct stages of the transformation process characterized by different economic structure, for example the higher weight of low cost industries at the beginning later the spread of finishing production and so on. As far as I encountered concepts of transformation and convergence those were uni-linear ones, presented a certain set of economic policies as universal balm for the problems and implicitly or explicitly perceived that Hungary should act accordingly at the start, keep the right direction and without further efforts or additional policies the Hungarian economy will be similar to the &#8211; let’s say &#8211; Austrian in 10-15 years. I’m not really interested in the time span, it is rather an illusion, I suspect, but it is not the real problem with this perception. If it is not completely right (and every country in the region has its ups and downs, stagnation periods etc. in the last two decades) than another question emerges, whether the present problems are simply problems of competivity or at the same time signals that a transitional phase is nearing its end making the policy proposal not as effective as it is expected? For example the ratio of high tech goods in export was far the largest in the region in Hungary, and I’m not sure that the same labor cost-competivity oriented policies would be equally effective if someone would aim at those sectors and not at car-making. There is an inflow of outsourced services in the region, but it is not making jobs as fast as industrial FDI used to. On the other hand I’m a bit concerned of the outcome of the crisis as well. Firstly I’m not convinced that in the future companies will be able to find so easily the necessary financial resources for investment, as it was common before the crisis. (Human cautiousness, tighter regulations, distrust in the innovative assets etc. can be mentioned as factors.) Even if the tightening of credit won’t last too long it would affect Hungary in a very sensitive phase. Secondly, what if the consumption patterns won’t return to those practiced before the crisis? Which sectors will be affected? (I know that we are not capable to foresee the future but is it really wise to act according to our earlier state of knowledge when we are convinced that things are profoundly changing?) And we can mention the demography as setting the limits of relatively low-cost labor oriented development as well.</p>
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		<title>By: Wolff</title>
		<link>http://fistfulofeuros.net/afoe/is-the-condition-of-hungarys-economy-really-as-bad-as-it-seems-to-be/comment-page-1/#comment-24357</link>
		<dc:creator>Wolff</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 16 Mar 2009 13:47:26 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://fistfulofeuros.net/?p=5066#comment-24357</guid>
		<description>Hi, Edward it was really kind from you to post such a benevolent analysis at our national holiday, I mean it honestly. As for the short term perspectives I wouldn&#039;t contest your view, it is too evident that an economy with such a huge share of export oriented sectors has nothing else to do than wait for Germany&#039;s recovery. (Even though at the level of individual companies the devaluation brought some advantages, I know of some that were earlier competing with Slovak contenders and now they are in a competition with Poles.) As for the longer perspective I agree with the general picture, that Hungary is not in a dead and, neither doomed, and I&#039;m equally concerned about demographic change. 

But I have my doubts and questions to raise as well, regarding the necessary adjustment, more precisely the limits of change driven by macro economical means and the resulting social issues. The first one is the amount of real reserves in labor supply and the flexibility of labor market. As far as I comprehend the proposals supported by an argumentation from a macro perspective implies that there are many people willing to work and there are many entrepreneurs willing to give them a place, but because of high costs (especially around average wages) they are either used illegally or simply not. But we are speaking of an extraordinary number of people in the working age, more than one million, while only less than half of them are registered as unemployed. Although the present rate of unemployment is quite high, even reducing it to a 4-5% wouldn&#039;t mean more than 150 000 - 200 000 new jobs and therefore the same number of new contributors to social systems. It would be better, but far from being a real relief for those systems.

There is an implicitly ongoing debate about the effectivity of the proposed measures (regulations aimed at increasing the flexibility of the labor market, tax-cuts etc.) but not among economists (only a few express their doubts about the reality of the perceived results) rather between sociologists and economists. (It is an implicit debate, because economists usually use very limited empirical data to assess the outcome of changes, while sociologists have data and their arguments are based on that, but economists simply do not care...Therefore everyone addresses its own professional audiences.) Sociologists argue, that as a result of the transformation process the majority of those who were laid off became detached from the world of labor, their skills are outdated and useless, their knowledge obsolete, they are practically illiterate, they haven&#039;t got the means, the will and culture of moving out of their microcosms in order to work somewhere else because of the lack of examples of personal success based on such strategies and so on. To sum it up: where economists&#039; glance catch a huge workforce eager to find a job, only obstructed by the inflexibility caused by market regulations and tax-system, sociologists glare at a mass with inadequate skills and incapable to act according to the demands of contemporary economy.

Both camps have its proofs in the form of examples. The economists point at the cases of Slovakia, Romania, Poland, the Baltics, as countries where unemployment declined and employment figures rose sharply after similar measures, while sociologists argue, that the significant cut in social security contributions during the Fidesz governments term (10%) brought only 100-150 000 new jobs, far from the expectations then and now. (Obviously both sides are keen on omitting uncomfortable facts, economists simply overlook the mass migration and its effects on employment from every country especially after the EU accession they use as textbook example, sociologists rarely take into account that the above mentioned cuts were almost completely balanced by the raising of the minimal wage.)

Anyway, I belong to those, who are rather sceptical towards the assumptions that regulation and tax-cut will boost employment either through new jobs created by SME-s or by attracting FDI and providing investors with the necessary workforce. At least not sustainably in the long term. I admit that some reserves exist, either in the form of illegal work (although I’m not certain that the state is really able to pay the costs of the legalizing in the form of sufficient tax cuts in order to make legal work attractive enough for employers as state authorities do not seem to be very effective in revealing such practicies) or in the form of unemployed people eager to work. But I really wouldn’t been surprised if even in 4-5 years time serious labor shortages would occur if the problem would be addressed only through restructuring of the tax system and through relaxing regulations.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hi, Edward it was really kind from you to post such a benevolent analysis at our national holiday, I mean it honestly. As for the short term perspectives I wouldn&#8217;t contest your view, it is too evident that an economy with such a huge share of export oriented sectors has nothing else to do than wait for Germany&#8217;s recovery. (Even though at the level of individual companies the devaluation brought some advantages, I know of some that were earlier competing with Slovak contenders and now they are in a competition with Poles.) As for the longer perspective I agree with the general picture, that Hungary is not in a dead and, neither doomed, and I&#8217;m equally concerned about demographic change. </p>
<p>But I have my doubts and questions to raise as well, regarding the necessary adjustment, more precisely the limits of change driven by macro economical means and the resulting social issues. The first one is the amount of real reserves in labor supply and the flexibility of labor market. As far as I comprehend the proposals supported by an argumentation from a macro perspective implies that there are many people willing to work and there are many entrepreneurs willing to give them a place, but because of high costs (especially around average wages) they are either used illegally or simply not. But we are speaking of an extraordinary number of people in the working age, more than one million, while only less than half of them are registered as unemployed. Although the present rate of unemployment is quite high, even reducing it to a 4-5% wouldn&#8217;t mean more than 150 000 &#8211; 200 000 new jobs and therefore the same number of new contributors to social systems. It would be better, but far from being a real relief for those systems.</p>
<p>There is an implicitly ongoing debate about the effectivity of the proposed measures (regulations aimed at increasing the flexibility of the labor market, tax-cuts etc.) but not among economists (only a few express their doubts about the reality of the perceived results) rather between sociologists and economists. (It is an implicit debate, because economists usually use very limited empirical data to assess the outcome of changes, while sociologists have data and their arguments are based on that, but economists simply do not care&#8230;Therefore everyone addresses its own professional audiences.) Sociologists argue, that as a result of the transformation process the majority of those who were laid off became detached from the world of labor, their skills are outdated and useless, their knowledge obsolete, they are practically illiterate, they haven&#8217;t got the means, the will and culture of moving out of their microcosms in order to work somewhere else because of the lack of examples of personal success based on such strategies and so on. To sum it up: where economists&#8217; glance catch a huge workforce eager to find a job, only obstructed by the inflexibility caused by market regulations and tax-system, sociologists glare at a mass with inadequate skills and incapable to act according to the demands of contemporary economy.</p>
<p>Both camps have its proofs in the form of examples. The economists point at the cases of Slovakia, Romania, Poland, the Baltics, as countries where unemployment declined and employment figures rose sharply after similar measures, while sociologists argue, that the significant cut in social security contributions during the Fidesz governments term (10%) brought only 100-150 000 new jobs, far from the expectations then and now. (Obviously both sides are keen on omitting uncomfortable facts, economists simply overlook the mass migration and its effects on employment from every country especially after the EU accession they use as textbook example, sociologists rarely take into account that the above mentioned cuts were almost completely balanced by the raising of the minimal wage.)</p>
<p>Anyway, I belong to those, who are rather sceptical towards the assumptions that regulation and tax-cut will boost employment either through new jobs created by SME-s or by attracting FDI and providing investors with the necessary workforce. At least not sustainably in the long term. I admit that some reserves exist, either in the form of illegal work (although I’m not certain that the state is really able to pay the costs of the legalizing in the form of sufficient tax cuts in order to make legal work attractive enough for employers as state authorities do not seem to be very effective in revealing such practicies) or in the form of unemployed people eager to work. But I really wouldn’t been surprised if even in 4-5 years time serious labor shortages would occur if the problem would be addressed only through restructuring of the tax system and through relaxing regulations.</p>
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		<title>By: Edward Hugh</title>
		<link>http://fistfulofeuros.net/afoe/is-the-condition-of-hungarys-economy-really-as-bad-as-it-seems-to-be/comment-page-1/#comment-24333</link>
		<dc:creator>Edward Hugh</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 15 Mar 2009 21:36:30 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://fistfulofeuros.net/?p=5066#comment-24333</guid>
		<description>Hello David,

&quot;Would this not be likely to provoke a currency crash?&quot;

Well I don&#039;t think so. Why would the currency crash after restructuring the household debt? 

To some extent this game with the forint is only going on at the moment due to the perceived vulnerability with the CHF loans, and the inability to price the forint at a level which makes Hungarian exports competitive.

Once that issue is gone, what would people be speculating against with the currency?

Basically, it is a mute point whether or not the forint is now competitively valued. If it isn&#039;t, and they don&#039;t have the CHF loans to thing about, what happens if the currency drops another 20% - their rivals in industrial products would only be complaining about &quot;unfair competition&quot; that&#039;s all. 

The point here is that Hungary isn&#039;t quite the &quot;basket case&quot; it is being treated as. My view is that if they can solve the loans problem they can reduce interest rates internally, and let the currency drop a bit more, no real problem.

They have real industrial capacity, and services to export, and they would be near to closing the current account gap by exports were we not in the middle of a massive economic depression, not like some economies I could mention. 

This is very different from somewhere - eg - like Argentina, where they had only banks, financial services, telephone companies, and agriculture, with no known export industry to mention.

Obviously, eg, if they had a cheaper currency, all the potential investment for Slovakia would go straight to Hungary (since Slovaks can come over the border to work, and many of them are already going on weekend shopping expeditions) and even workers could cross the frontier to work in Hungary (this I imagine is going to happen if Hungary and the CR aren&#039;t in the eurozone soon). 

This is not the same thing as saying that Hungary is going to be a stellar growth economy again, it isn&#039;t, but it isn&#039;t going to starve either, and it is going to be an interesting place to invest, especially after all the reforms which will be introduced with an IMF gun at their head. Here, if we look at Turkey to, we have to admit that the IMF is often much more effective than Brussels in this sense.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hello David,</p>
<p>&#8220;Would this not be likely to provoke a currency crash?&#8221;</p>
<p>Well I don&#8217;t think so. Why would the currency crash after restructuring the household debt? </p>
<p>To some extent this game with the forint is only going on at the moment due to the perceived vulnerability with the CHF loans, and the inability to price the forint at a level which makes Hungarian exports competitive.</p>
<p>Once that issue is gone, what would people be speculating against with the currency?</p>
<p>Basically, it is a mute point whether or not the forint is now competitively valued. If it isn&#8217;t, and they don&#8217;t have the CHF loans to thing about, what happens if the currency drops another 20% &#8211; their rivals in industrial products would only be complaining about &#8220;unfair competition&#8221; that&#8217;s all. </p>
<p>The point here is that Hungary isn&#8217;t quite the &#8220;basket case&#8221; it is being treated as. My view is that if they can solve the loans problem they can reduce interest rates internally, and let the currency drop a bit more, no real problem.</p>
<p>They have real industrial capacity, and services to export, and they would be near to closing the current account gap by exports were we not in the middle of a massive economic depression, not like some economies I could mention. </p>
<p>This is very different from somewhere &#8211; eg &#8211; like Argentina, where they had only banks, financial services, telephone companies, and agriculture, with no known export industry to mention.</p>
<p>Obviously, eg, if they had a cheaper currency, all the potential investment for Slovakia would go straight to Hungary (since Slovaks can come over the border to work, and many of them are already going on weekend shopping expeditions) and even workers could cross the frontier to work in Hungary (this I imagine is going to happen if Hungary and the CR aren&#8217;t in the eurozone soon). </p>
<p>This is not the same thing as saying that Hungary is going to be a stellar growth economy again, it isn&#8217;t, but it isn&#8217;t going to starve either, and it is going to be an interesting place to invest, especially after all the reforms which will be introduced with an IMF gun at their head. Here, if we look at Turkey to, we have to admit that the IMF is often much more effective than Brussels in this sense.</p>
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		<title>By: David</title>
		<link>http://fistfulofeuros.net/afoe/is-the-condition-of-hungarys-economy-really-as-bad-as-it-seems-to-be/comment-page-1/#comment-24324</link>
		<dc:creator>David</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 15 Mar 2009 17:20:40 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://fistfulofeuros.net/?p=5066#comment-24324</guid>
		<description>Interesting article.  I do have one concern, however.

If the Hungarian state announced that it was going to convert all Euro and Swiss Franc loans into Forints, surely this would be basically saying that it is going to massively devalue the forint.

Would this not be likely to provoke a currency crash?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Interesting article.  I do have one concern, however.</p>
<p>If the Hungarian state announced that it was going to convert all Euro and Swiss Franc loans into Forints, surely this would be basically saying that it is going to massively devalue the forint.</p>
<p>Would this not be likely to provoke a currency crash?</p>
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