Just in case anyone was in any doubt last weeks newspaper headlines blared it out for us loud and clear – Japanese inflation is back, and has even hit levels last seen in 1982. (Click on image below for better viewing).
Olli Rehn’s last ECOFIN press conference has just finished. AFOE would like to take this momentous occasion as an opportunity to salute Rehn’s towering achievements, and Matthew Yglesias passes on exactly what we need.
Yes, we know he was Enlargement Commissioner. But seriously folks, Rehn took office as Commissioner for EMU on the 9th of February 2010. If you were to overlay those two charts, the lines would diverge essentially right then.
And, desperately, he thinks he’s done a brilliant job:
— Olli Rehn (@ollirehn) June 20, 2014
It’s only topped by the astonishing fact that some Iraq War advocates not only continue to claim that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, but claim that the weapons are still present to this day.
Reading the most recent statements from Bank of Japan Governor Haruhiko Kuroda or Finance Minister Taro Aso you would get the impression that the days of deflation are now well and truly numbered in Japan. Martin Schulz, economist at Fujitsu Research Institute in Tokyo, goes even further. “Deflation is over in Japan,” he told Bloomberg Television First Up’s Angie Lau . Even Japan’s industrial leaders now believe inflation is here to stay: the country’s inflation rate will be 1.5 percent in the spring of 2015, and 1.7 percent in 2017, according to average forecasts in a Bank of Japan survey conducted in March this year. Continue reading
“I now suspect that the kind of moderate economic policy regime…… that by and large lets markets work, but in which the government is ready both to rein in excesses and fight slumps – is inherently unstable.”
Paul Krugman – The Instability of Moderation
“Conventional macreconomic theory leaves us in a very serious problem, because we all seem to agree that whereas you can keep the federal funds rate at a low level forever it’s much harder to do extraordinary measures that go beyond that forever. But the underlying problem may be there forever. It’s much more difficult to say, well we only needed deficits during the short period of the crisis if equilibrium interest rates can’t be achieved given the prevailing rate of inflation.”
The Spanish National Statistics Office (INE) today published the first detailed estimate of Spain’s Q1 GDP. Basically they confirm the gist of the original Bank of Spain numbers (see my report of 25 March below) although there are some important nuances. Continue reading
Word has it that Mario Draghi is busily working up a new version of his “whatever it takes” methodology. This time the objective is not saving the Eurozone, but maintaining the region’s inflation at or near the ECBs official 2% inflation objective. The first time round the President of the Euro Area’s central bank had it easy, since market participants took him at his word and he effectively needed to do nothing to comply. This time though, as they say, it will be different.
There is no doubt that Greece’s recent bond sale was an exciting and even invigorating moment for many people. The WSJ’s Simon Nixon, for example, called it “a symbolically important moment for the euro crisis”. Reuters’ Marius Zaharia suggested the speed of the come back could even be a game-changer for the heavily indebted southern European country. Certainly there can be little doubt that, as Nixon puts it, the turn round in market fortunes was a remarkable achievement, illustrative of just “how far market sentiment toward Southern Europe has changed”.
Looking for trends and correlations in that landslide of economic data which arrives, day in and day out, on our desks is normally something akin to trying to find a needle in a very large and raggedy haystack. From time to time, however, some things are just to obvious not to be noticed, like the ever rising levels of debt on the EU periphery and the growing demand from political leaders there for some kind of QE type initiative from the European central bank, for example. Sure, there is no obvious causal connecting here – the missing “middle term” linking the two would probably be all that ongoing deflation risk – but the inability of governments to contain their debt levels is a consequence of having low growth and low inflation, as is the wish being ever more insistently expressed by Southern Europe’s political leaders that the ECB were more like the Bank of Japan. Continue reading
Here’s an interesting chart.
Why the poor can have "things" but can't escape poverty pic.twitter.com/nzE6f6ONLh
— Mark Mellman (@MarkMellman) May 4, 2014
The eurozone version of this is the debate about to what extent the relative increase in prices in southern Europe in the 2000s represented an increase in wage costs, and to what extent it represented wider inflation. I certainly remember a lot of concern about “mileuristas”, and of course the Greek version of living on €1,000 a month was living on €700 a month. The classic example is the fact that the CPI doesn’t include housing costs, and there was a housing bubble, dammit.
I used to be quite snarky about people who claimed there was really huge inflation because they saw someone selling this or that for so much and it wasn’t like that in my day. I am less so now. In a real sense, if inflation doesn’t include food or housing or healthcare or energy, is it a useful measurement?
So you might think I would be pleased at the content of this piece. But I’m very far from it. The reason is, basically, Piketty.
If you want r to get under g and stay there, inflation and financial-repression is a big part of the picture. And for this to be of any use, it has to be proper inflation – i.e. the sort that includes wages. You could make a case that the price stability the ECB achieved was actually more like “wage stability”. I wonder if prices expressed in terms of earnings is a measure we should monitor.