Ireland and Greece, again

Hans-Werner Sinn has an op-ed in Saturday’s New York Times calling (again) for a Greek exit from the Euro, a recommendation on which he agrees, as he notes, with Paul Krugman and Joseph Stiglitz. Part of his argument is that is that an official lending “bailout” program within the Euro won’t work because it will impede the necessary decline in local prices to make Greece competitive again within the single currency. His evidence that not getting a bailout improves competitiveness is … Ireland:

Take the case of Ireland. Like Greece, Ireland became too expensive, as interest rates fell sharply during the introduction of the euro. When the bubble burst, in late 2006, no fiscal rescue was available. The Irish tightened their belts and underwent a drastic internal devaluation by cutting wages, which in turn led to lower prices for Irish goods both in absolute and relative terms. This made the Irish economy competitive again.

But, you might object, I have a clear memory of Ireland getting a Troika bailout? Indeed –

Granted, Ireland also received fiscal aid. But that came much later, toward the end of 2010, and when it came, the internal devaluation stopped almost immediately. Twelve of the 13 percentage points of the Irish decline in relative product prices came before that date.

This interpretation of Ireland plays an important role in Sinn’s recommendation for Greece: it showed that it’s possible to manage a real devaluation without a bailout, but Greece began too late and had too far to go for this route to be feasible, hence it should leave the Euro.

But is this valid?

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Water under the bridge

From that Eurogroup Greece prior actions draft still under discussion in the middle of the night in Brussels –

There are serious concerns regarding the sustainability of Greek debt. This is due to the easing of policies during the last twelve months, which resulted in the recent deterioration in the domestic macroeconomic and financial environment.

It’s a truly remarkable statement that concerns about the sustainability of Greek debt only arose in the last year, since the 2010 IMF bailout — an event that everyone, including the IMF, seems to have forgotten — was only rammed through by ignoring the normal IMF debt sustainability criterion.

UPDATE: The identical statement is in the final draft.

 

Two year escape hatch

IMF Chief Economist Olivier Blanchard in a new blog post defending the 2010 Greece program against various criticisms, including the absence of debt restructuring –

Moreover, private creditors were not off the hook, and, in 2012, debt was substantially reduced: The 2012 private sector involvement (PSI) operation led to a haircut of more than 50% on about €200 billion of privately held debt, so leading to a decrease in debt of over €100 billion (to be concrete, a reduction of debt of 10,000 euros per Greek citizen). And the shift from private to official creditors came with much better terms, namely below market rates and long maturities.

Below the fold, a few relevant sentences from the IMF’s own ex-post evaluation of the 2010 Greece program, issued in 2013. Bottom line: what could be achieved in 2012 was severely constrained by what was (not) done in 2010, and the 2012 restructuring destroyed a core assumption of the 2010 program. In particular, when debt restructuring [private sector involvement (PSI)] was done, the hit on the remaining private sector creditors, including Greek banks, had to be larger because other private creditors were gone and official creditors that had taken on their debt, including the ECB, were off the table in the restructuring. It was then much harder for Greece to return to the market as the 2010 program had assumed, and the banks needed a lot more money to recapitalize.

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When extreme circumstances warrant setting up a lender of last resort within a larger currency union

From address by Professor Cormac O’Gráda, School of Economics, University College Dublin, to the Central Bank of Ireland Whitaker Lecture, 29 June 2011. The context is the Irish Free State’s 1 for 1 currency peg with the pound sterling, a continuation of the pre-1922 UK pound for Ireland –

The Emergency (World War II) also produced a defining moment in Irish banking history. Until then, Ireland’s lack of a central bank had not worried its joint-stock banks; on the contrary, they did not relish the idea. For over a century the Bank of Ireland had played the role of quasi-central bank, while looking on the Bank of England as its friend in need. Just a few days before the outbreak of war a delegation from College Green (Bank of Ireland HQ) traveled to London for reassurance about the availability of foreign exchange and the free repatriation of Irish bank assets held in London. In what must have been a difficult moment for the Irish bankers, the Governor of the Bank of England Montague Norman told them that:

notwithstanding the long and intimate relations between the two institutions he was not prepared to commit the Bank of England by promising to come to the assistance of the Bank of Ireland in an emergency of the nature under discussion. As an ordinary banking transaction there would be no question whatever about making an advance to the Bank, but in an emergency situation there was an important principal (sic) involved. The Bank of England looked upon Eire as a Dominion… Mr. Norman stressed the view that the Bank ‘whose centre of gravity was in Eire’ should look to their own Treasury or the Currency Commission to help them over difficult periods. Sir John [Keane, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Ireland] pointed out that the position in Eire did not admit of a solution in that way, as the [Irish] Treasury came to the Bank when it was short of funds, and the [Irish] Currency Commission was not a lender of the last resort. Mr. Norman then urged that as Eire was a separate political entity it should have a Central Bank of its own.

And so it took the Emergency and Montagu Norman to persuade the Bank of Ireland to switch its loyalty fully to the new state, and for the other joint stock banks to appreciate the need for an Irish central bank. The Central Bank Act followed in 1942.

The sterling currency union nonetheless survived up until Ireland joining the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary System in 1979.

Low payoff from structural reforms in Greece?

The IMF has released a preliminary debt sustainability analysis for Greece — undertaken before this week’s cash crisis but after its adjustments to the numbers to take account of the deterioration in the relationship between Greece and its creditors since January. The document can be read cynically as the IMF using Syriza as an excuse to dump all the unrealistic assumptions in their earlier calculations, but it’s still helpful in spelling out those assumptions — which were there for everyone to see. Arguably the most incredible scenario was for growth (see Box 2):

What would real GDP growth look like if  total factor productivity (TFP) growth were to remain at the historical average rates since Greece joined the EU? Given the shrinking working-age population (as projected by Eurostat) and maintaining investment at its projected ratio of 19 percent of GDP from 2019 onwards (up from 11 percent currently), real GDP growth would be expected to average –0.6 percent per year in steady state. If labor force participation increased to the highest in the euro area, unemployment fell to German levels, and TFP growth reached the average in the euro area since 1980, real GDP growth would average 0.8 percent of GDP. Only if TFP growth were to reach Irish levels, that is, the best performer in the euro area, would real GDP growth average about 2 percent in steady state. 

That last assumption — 2 percent long-term growth — was the one that was actually in the program until now! These are of course results from an economic model that could be right or wrong. But that’s part of the political challenge of these lending programs: undertake massive effort on “reforms” and you might, if everything else goes well, get a not-especially-exciting growth rate. And the voters on Sunday don’t even know which set of “reforms” they are voting on, let alone their long-term consequences.

UPDATE: Note that the debt sustainability analysis is on the ballot on Sunday!

Occupational shifts in the UK

Following up on the ideas in this post, here’s an interesting chart from the Bank of England Inflation Report.

composhift

In our model, people advance along at least locally optimal career paths in expansions, and then have to find a new one in recessions. So you’d expect job tenure, marked in green, to reflect the business cycle – people accumulate it during expansions and lose it in recessions – and that’s precisely what we see. In 1996-2000, when unemployment dropped sharply, it was a strongly negative contributor to wage growth. After that, it began to be a positive contribution as the new hires progressively accumulated tenure and advanced along their career paths. We also see a bit of this after the .com crash. However, it didn’t become a big negative item after the great financial crisis, perhaps because unemployment didn’t rise as much as expected.

The effect of change in qualifications has been quite surprising; it was negative for most of the boom, and then very positive immediately post-crisis.

From 1999 to 2007, workers changing between occupations seems to have been a significant contributor to wage growth (about +0.2% a year). Between 1996 and 2002, workers changing between industries was a positive contribution, but it then swung negative between 2002 and 2006, before becoming positive again in 2007.

During the great financial crisis, it was significantly negative, and it then became positive in the recovery. Since then, it’s disappeared as a factor. Change between occupations, however, was strongly positive in the crisis, erratic and noisy in the recovery, and since Q1 2013, has become very strongly negative. So has the effect of job tenure. At the moment, the combination of tenure and occupational change accounts for -0.75 percentage points of wage growth. The strong negative tenure effect is comparable to that in the late 90s expansion, implying significant net hiring. The occupational change effect is, however, unprecedentedly awful, and it is increasing.

This is consistent with the perverse selection I proposed in the original post. The big difference between now and the 90s experience, though, is that the occupational shift effect is much bigger.

Which is also consistent with making Jobseekers’ Allowance claimants stand around Finsbury Park station wearing a hi-viz vest to no particular purpose.

If Greece Had Not Existed, Europe’s Leaders Would Have Had to Invent It

He must be chosen from among you as a scapegoat. Hipponax

One of the more intriguing aspects of the whole modern Greek drama is the tragicomic way the country seems to be constantly condemned to live out well known themes which come from its own mythology. The latest example is the way what was once the cradle of European civilization has allowed itself to be converted into the role model for everything its fellow Europeans are not. Or at least, this is the story we are supposed to believe. Continue reading

ECB Taper News

What Business Insider’s Mike Bird somewhat ironically calls #euroboom2015 seems to be well and truly with us.

The WSJ’s Simon Nixon spelled  it out for us in his “QE is Working Better than the ECB Dared Hope” article:  “one month into the ECB’s €1 trillion ($1.06 trillion) quantitative-easing program, and ECB President Mario Draghi was only too happy to take credit for a remarkable turnaround in the economy’s fortunes at Wednesday’s news conference.” And he goes on to give examples:

“Growth forecasts have been continually revised up since January when the program was announced: the International Monetary Fund said this week it now expects the eurozone to grow by 1.5% in 2015. Business and consumer confidence are the highest since 2007. Bank lending is finally picking up.”

“The strongest growth is coming from former crisis countries: Spain is forecast to grow by up to 3% and Ireland up to 4% this year. Meanwhile German policy makers fret that with growth likely to hit 2.5%, the economy may overheat.”

 Naturally, as he also says, “not all of this can be traced to quantitative easing.” But then, here comes the point: “Indeed, if the ECB had delayed its decision on quantitative easing until March, as the Bundesbank had urged, it may have concluded it didn’t need to buy any bonds at all.” Continue reading